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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Historians argue that Secretary of State William H. Seward abandoned the pursuit of his 
expansionist vision during the Civil War. They interpret his conduct of wartime 
Mexican policy as a case in point for this argument. Although Seward wished to see the 
Mexican republic stabilised and eventually incorporated into the United States, he 
allegedly remained neutral towards the French invasion of Mexico 1862-67 in order to 
prevent Emperor Napoleon III from striking up an alliance with the Confederacy. 
This thesis argues that Seward never gave up expansionism and that his wartime 
Mexican policy was designed to facilitate the future absorption of that country into the 
U.S. republic. Seward believed the Civil War signalled the coming demise of slavery, 
which had complicated previous instances of national territorial growth, in the United 
States. He also saw the French invasion of Mexico as an opportunity for the Mexicans 
to prove their commitment to republicanism and therefore their readiness to become 
citizens of the U.S. republic. Once both these crises had passed, Seward predicted, the 
next stages of U.S. expansionism – the peaceful incorporation of Mexico into the United 
States – would follow. As secretary of state, Seward used his influence over Mexican 
policy to facilitate the realisation of this goal. 
This thesis tracks the development of Seward’s pre-war expansionist outlook 
and compares it to his approach to wartime relations with Mexico, an undertaking not 
yet attempted by historians. During the antebellum era Seward advocated a method for 
expansion whereby the United States would build relations based on non-intervention, 
ideological affinity, and commercial cooperation with those countries it wished to 
absorb. These same principles guided and shaped Seward’s Mexican policy and his 
response to the French invasion in 1862. In regards to Mexico, Seward made significant 
advances towards furthering his expansionist ambitions during the Civil War. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Union lieutenant general Ulysses S. Grant was understandably tired of warfare by the 
time he returned to Washington D.C. in the spring of 1865. After four years of fighting 
the Confederates he had led his troops to victory at Appomattox on 9 April, forced the 
surrender of Southern general Robert E. Lee, and effectively ended the American Civil 
War. Yet on 16 June, at the invitation of President Andrew Johnson, Grant attended a 
cabinet meeting in which he proposed that the administration send an army of U.S. 
volunteers into Mexico to help President Benito Juárez throw out his country’s French 
invaders. Grant insisted that French emperor Louis Napoleon III’s ultimate goal was to 
use his foothold in Mexico to launch an attack on the United States. Napoleon’s scheme 
was aided, Grant continued, by the large number of ex-Confederates crossing the border 
and joining the French forces in hopes of receiving glory, land, and power in return. 
Grant told the cabinet that, in view of this, the “Civil War should not be considered 
completely ended while the French remained in Mexico.”1 
 
Grant had worked closely with Mexican minister to the United States Matias 
Romero in designing this plan for U.S. military action in Mexico.
2 
Upon hearing 
Grant’s report of the administration’s reaction to the proposal, Romero was 
disappointed but unsurprised to learn that Secretary of State William H. Seward “took 
the floor at once” to oppose the scheme.3 Since the start of the French invasion in 1862 
Romero’s efforts to build up popular and political support in the United States for 
intervention in Mexico had been repeatedly resisted and thwarted by Seward. The 
secretary, Romero surmised, wished to follow a policy of compliance towards the 
French in order to avoid pushing Napoleon into an alliance with the Confederacy.
4 
By 
mid-1865, with the Civil War over and France’s position in Mexico weakening, Romero 
 
 
 
 
1 Matias Romero to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), memorandum, 18 June 1865, in Mexican 
Lobby: Matias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867, trans. and ed. Thomas D. Schoonover (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 67. During his time in Washington Romero sent roughly seventy- 
five memorandums to his government’s foreign affairs department, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 
detailing major events in the United States and his communications with Northern statesmen and officials. 
Mexican Lobby is a collection of these memorandums, edited by Romero after his departure from the 
United States and later translated, edited, and organised for publication by Schoonover. 
2 Romero served as chargé d’affaires to the United States until he resigned in mid-1863 due to lack of 
funds for the conduct his lobbying campaign in the Union. He returned to Washington D.C. in October 
1863 after the Juárez government granted him increased funds and the rank of minister to the United 
States. 
3 Romero to SRE, memorandum, 18 June, 1865, in Mexican Lobby, trans. and ed. Schoonover, 67. 
4 Ibid. 
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found it difficult to understand why Seward continued to refuse to offer U.S. assistance 
to Mexico. 
Scholarly analyses of Seward’s response to the French invasion echo the 
interpretation Romero made in 1865. Throughout the Civil War the Lincoln 
administration feared European interference in its war with the Confederates. France’s 
textile industry suffered as a result of the Union’s blockade of Confederate ports, which 
prevented the exportation of Southern materials. Napoleon frequently considered 
granting recognition to the Confederacy and even intervening in the Civil War as a way 
of gaining access to Southern cotton. Marvin Goldwert argues that when Napoleon 
invaded Mexico, Seward acted with “cautious moderation” by remaining neutral 
towards the conflict in order to avoid giving France a reason to align itself with the 
Confederacy.
5 
Jay Sexton corroborates this view when he concludes that the 
 
“constraints of the Civil War” compelled Seward to allow Napoleon’s invasion of 
 
Mexico to proceed.
6
 
 
This interpretation of the secretary’s Mexican policy stands as a case in point for 
the broader conclusions drawn by historians regarding Seward’s t ime in the State 
Department. Scholarly research has established Seward as one of the most committed 
expansionist U.S. politicians of the nineteenth century.
7 
Throughout his career he 
pushed for the physical enlargement and commercial advancement of the United States. 
 
He also wished for a Western Hemisphere, defined as North, South, and Central 
America and the Caribbean, of republican nations gathered under the economic and 
ideological influence of the U.S. republic. Historians say, however, that Seward made 
little or no effort to further this expansionist agenda during the Civil War. The notable 
exceptions are scholarly analyses of his Far Eastern policy.
8 
Seward viewed U.S. 
 
commercial penetration of the Far East as integral to the realisation of his vision for the 
 
 
 
5 Marvin Goldwert, “Matias Romero and Congressional Opposition to Seward’s Policy toward the French 
Intervention in Mexico,” The Americas 22, no. 1 (July 1965), 36. 
6 Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2011), 150. 
7 Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin 
to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 98-106; Thomas D. Schoonover, “Dollars 
over Dominion: United States Economic Interests in Mexico, 1861-1867,” Pacific Historical 
Review 45, no. 1 (February 1976), 26; Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 128-30; Walter G. Sharrow, “William 
Henry Seward and the Basis for American Empire, 1850-1860,” Pacific Historical Review 36, no. 3 
(August 1967), 325; Major L. Wilson, “The Repressible Conflict: Seward’s Concept of Progress and the 
Free-Soil Movement,” Journal of Southern History 37, no. 4 (November 1971), 540-41. 
8 Tyler Dennett, “Seward’s Far Eastern Policy,” American Historical Review 28, no. 1 (October 1922), 
45-62; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1963), 26-31. 
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United States’ future. Tyler Dennett notes that throughout his tenure as secretary of 
state Seward advanced the traditional U.S. “open door” policy in the region by 
conducting it through a co-operative method. In May 1861, for instance, Seward 
proposed a joint expedition with Great Britain, Russia, France, and the Netherlands to 
ensure the Japanese did not renege on the terms of the Ansei Treaties.
9 
Seward was 
 
“willing to pay the price of co-operation” with the Europeans and thereby significantly 
alter U.S. policy in the Far East.
10 
In doing so, Dennett argues, the secretary “felt 
himself to be preparing the way” for U.S. global commercial ascendancy.11 
For historians, Far Eastern policy marks the beginning and end of Seward’s 
wartime expansionism. Richard Immerman concludes that, despite being one of the 
most ardent expansionists of his generation, Seward’s “stewardship of the Lincoln 
administration’s foreign affairs during the Civil War provided little hint of … his robust 
 
influence on the growth of America’s empire.”12 Immerman’s assumption is the result 
of the Euro-centric perspective which dominates academic studies of Civil War 
diplomacy. Research on the international dimensions of the Civil War has been growing 
in recent decades, yet historians principally focus on Union and Confederate relations 
with the European powers.
13 
This has led Immerman and other scholars to approach 
Seward’s wartime Mexican policy with the assumption that the secretary’s main 
concern was how his conduct of relations with Mexico would affect his nation’s 
relationships with the European powers. Historians have yet to fully examine the ways 
in which Seward’s Mexican policy was shaped and driven by his desires and ambitions 
for the future of the U.S.-Mexican relationship. This thesis attempts this undertaking. 
This thesis addresses another oversight in scholarly research regarding U.S. 
wartime Mexican policy. Given their belief that Seward’s response to Napoleon’s 
invasion of Mexico was designed to prevent French intervention in the Civil War, 
Goldwert and Sexton find it intriguing that the policy faced substantial domestic 
political opposition, particularly from Northern congressmen. Goldwert characterises 
this opposition as a “significant “round” in the historic struggle between the executive 
 
 
 
 
9 Dennett, “Seward’s Far Eastern Policy,” 49. 
10 Ibid., 51. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 117. 
13 Howard Jones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Relations (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International 
Dimensions of the American Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999). 
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and the legislature for control of United States foreign policy.”14 It took on particular 
vehemence, he adds, because of the animosity building throughout the Civil War 
between Radical Republicans in Congress and the largely moderate Lincoln 
administration.
15 
Goldwert concludes that although most Northern congressmen agreed 
with Seward’s Mexican policy, they publicly criticised it in order to undermine the 
administration and wrest control over policy-making from the executive branch. 
An element of partisan politicking was responsible for the rise of Mexican 
policy in Northern political discourse during the Civil War. Goldwert, however, does 
not sufficiently answer the question of why Mexican policy became such an effective 
political weapon in the early 1860s. Sexton’s research goes some way in addressing this 
issue. He notes that Northern Democrats, consistently the targets of “charges of 
disloyalty” during the Civil War, condemned the administration’s neutrality towards the 
French invasion as un-republican.
16 
This allowed the Democrats to cast themselves as 
patriots and defenders of republican values. Sexton goes on to note that during the final 
year of the Civil War Northern politicians of all stripes began to call for intervention in 
Mexico as a means of expressing their loyalty to the U.S. republic and its founding 
principles. By the end of the Civil War, Sexton concludes, the policy of intervention in 
the Western Hemisphere to fight imperialism and defend republicanism had become a 
“nationalist symbol.”17 
Sexton is correct in noting that during the early 1860s the question of what the 
U.S. response should be to the French invasio n of Mexico became fused with Northern 
politicians’ attitudes regarding their country’s identity, role, and responsibilit ies. Sexton 
confines his study, however, to the final months of the Civil War. He therefore 
mistakenly accounts for Northern political support for intervention in Mexico by 
pointing to a resurging sense of national strength which was allegedly sweeping across 
the Union as the Civil War drew to a close. As the reunification of the United States 
seemed increasingly certain, Sexton argues, Northern politicians wished to demonstrate 
the renewed power and unity of their country in the eyes of the international 
community.
18 
Calls for military action in Mexico to throw out the French increased as a 
 
result. This thesis tracks the development of domestic political discourse surrounding 
 
 
 
14 Goldwert, “Matias Romero,” 22. 
15 Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 151-58. 
16 Ibid., 152. 
17 Ibid., 158. 
18 Ibid., 159. 
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Mexican policy throughout the entire Civil War. In doing so, it reveals a different 
motivation working upon the Northern political advocates of intervention in Mexico. 
Historical analyses of Seward’s conduct of Mexican policy and his struggle with 
his domestic critics creates a picture which this thesis will show to be incomplete. What 
Romero failed to perceive in 1865, although it is doubtful whether it would have 
brought him much consolation even if he had, was that Seward’s response to the French 
invasion was driven by more than a wish to stay on good terms with Napoleon. It was 
created within a conceptual framework of expansion and geared towards laying the 
groundwork for the future peaceful absorption of Mexico into the United States. Due to 
the outbreak of concurrent crises in the United States and Mexico, the 1860s was a 
period of serious uncertainty regarding the future of republican government in North 
America. Seward, however, possessed an unerring faith that the North would win the 
Civil War and the Mexicans would throw out their French invaders. This outlook 
allowed him to see the potential advantages which the American Civil War and the 
French invasion of Mexico held for future of the U.S. republic. 
In the antebellum period slavery had been the principal cause of conflict and 
obstruction in instances of U.S. continental expansion. At the outset of the Civil War, 
Seward perceived that a Northern victory would also mean the end of the peculiar 
institution in the United States. This accomplished, the country would be able to embark 
on a programme of territorial extension free from the hindrance of sectional disputes. 
One of Seward’s chief expansionist objectives was the peaceful incorporation of 
Mexico into the United States. Throughout his pre-Civil War career he had consistently 
stipulated that this should occur only once the Mexicans had proven themselves 
committed to and capable of defending their own republican institutions. By adopting a 
neutral stance towards Napoleon’s attempt to impose a monarchy on Mexico, Seward 
believed he was providing the Mexican people with an opportunity to demonstrate this 
commitment. A Mexican victory over the French, moreover, would prove to the 
European imperialist nations that republicanism had taken root in the Western 
Hemisphere, and that the region could therefore no longer be considered prey for 
schemes of re-colonisation.  Seward’s confidence in the power of republican principles 
and ideals allowed him to predict that this period of crisis in North America would end 
with the restoration of both the U.S. and Mexican republics, and that t he absorption of 
Mexico into the United States would soon follow. 
9  
 
 
Domestic political criticism of Seward’s wartime Mexican policy was fuelled by 
 
a different interpretation of the events of the early 1860s. Gregory P. Downs notes that 
 
in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, a discourse emerged in U.S. politics rooted 
in the fear that the United States was becoming “Mexicanized.”19 The basis of U.S. 
“exceptionalism” lay in the notion that the United States was immune to the 
devolutionary process of disorder, anarchy, and disintegration which had ruined other 
republics. In the 1870s, however, U.S. politicians were concerned that the “line between 
violence and politics” had been irrevocably blurred by the Civil War. 20 The disputed 
1876 presidential election made many worry that this line might evaporate entirely and 
 
the nation would “fall into a spiral of civil wars.”21 Downs concludes that analogies 
 
with Mexico, a country which represented the typical failings of republican government, 
revealed the concern held by politicians that the United States was not an “exceptional” 
republic. 
A similar phenomenon occurred in the early 1860s. The secession of the 
Southern states and persistent instability within the Union during the Civil War led 
some Northern politicians to fear that the U.S. republic was degenerating. The French 
invasion of Mexico exacerbated this concern. Given their country’s weakened state, 
certain Union politicians saw this event as an ominous premonition of what would soon 
befall the U.S. republic. Like republics which had preceded it, the United States could 
be dismantled and returned to colonial rule. Wartime calls for intervention in Mexico 
were partially motivated by a perceived need to pre-emptively strike at the French. They 
were also driven by a desire to pull the United States out of its current crisis and enable 
the nation to reclaim its “exceptionalist” identity. A foreign venture to fight imperial 
monarchism, advocates of intervention claimed, would reawaken the shared republican 
sentiments of the people of the United States, bring the Northern and Southern states 
back together, and reassert the U.S. republic’s position as paramount nation in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
The narrative of “exceptionalism” runs deep throughout the history of the United 
 
States. Having assessed the relative success and failure of the ancient republics, 
classical political writers Niccoló Machiavelli and Baron de Montesquieu concluded 
that small republics were more likely to enjoy social harmony, stability, and therefore 
 
 
19 Gregory P. Downs, “The Mexicanization of American Politics: The United States’ Transnational Path 
from Civil War to Stabilization,” American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (April 2012), 387-409. 
20 
Ibid., 387. 
21 Ibid. 
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longevity.
22 
As republics inherently rejected the use of force to manage their 
populations, they were instead “held together by those invisible, intangible - but 
nevertheless quite real - links of nationalism and patriotism.”23 In the cases of Rome and 
Sparta, their “ever-increasing” populations had weakened these links.24 Too much 
diversity had diminished a sense of shared identity amongst their citizens, leading to 
internal disturbance and conflict. Such republics “became too populous, and too 
extensive for the simple democratical form” and one of two fates universally followed.25 
 
One was that these republics descended into anarchy, with domestic conflict causing 
regions of these countries to separate from the whole. The other was that, in an effort to 
draw together and control the diverse elements of their populations, the governments of 
these republics centralised and “degenerated convulsively into monarchies.”26 
Machiavelli and Montesquieu claimed that these fates also applied to republics 
 
which had embarked on expansionist foreign policies. Rome’s quest for empire had led 
 
to its government prioritising “opulence” over “conserving liberty” in the republic.27 
 
Although landed expansion jeopardised the republic’s internal harmony and the 
integrity of its institutions, Rome had pursued it as a means of gaining wealth and 
power. “Virtue” amongst Romans, defined by the classical writers as loyalty to the 
republic and a willingness to sacrifice to preserve it, decayed as a result.
28 
By contrast, 
republics which had focussed solely on “self-preservation” were more successful.29 
Montesquieu noted that Attica, Genoa, Venice, and Switzerland had all refrained from 
schemes of expansion and aggrandisement.
30 
Their small populations bred domestic 
tranquillity and ensured that the integrity of their institutions remained intact for longer. 
The warnings of Machiavelli and Montesquieu weighed heavily on the minds of 
the Founders of the United States as they searched for a means to create a stable 
republic which at its beginning already encompassed a vast amount of land. Their 
 
solution was the “confederate” republic. The system of checks and balances would 
 
 
 
22 Greg Russell, “Madison’s Realism and the Role of Domestic Ideals in Foreign Affairs,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Fall 1995), 714. 
23 Nolan Fowler, “Territorial Expansion – A Threat to the Republic?,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 53, 
no. 1 (January 1962), 36. 
24 
William Mullen, “Republics for Expansion: The School of Rome,” Arion 3, no. 3 (1976), 298. 
25 Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, “The Republic of the Moderns: Paine’s and Madison’s Novel 
Liberalism,” Polity 38, no. 4 (October 2006), 463. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mullen, “Republics for Expansion,” 312. 
28 Ibid., 329. 
29 Russell, “Madison’s Realism,” 714. 
30 Fowler, “Territorial Expansion,” 34. 
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ensure that no branch of the federal government was able to amass too much power. By 
granting each state a limited degree of sovereignty the Founders hoped to ensure that 
local and regional interests were served. The system of representative democracy, 
meanwhile, would allow for elected representatives to determine and create consensus 
around the national interest.
31
 
 
The Founders believed that the establishment of the U.S. republic therefore 
marked a “separation from the rest of the world and development of unprecedented 
forms of society and politics.”32 They had created a republic which was immune to the 
flaws and weaknesses of those which had preceded it and was therefore “exceptional.” 
“Like the famed ghost of Banquo,” however, uncertainty regarding U.S. 
“exceptionalism” persisted.33 This was particularly true at times of contemplated or 
actual territorial expansion. The extensio n of the nation’s boundaries frequently gave 
rise to concerns that the country was pushing the limits of its system and that its 
institutions would be unable to withstand the pressures of enlargement. Different 
methods for “safe” and “appropriate” expansio n which would allow the United States to 
maintain its integrity as it grew emerged and were integrated into the ideologies of the 
nation’s principal political parties. 
The Democratic-Republicans of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, and their Democratic ideological descendants, advocated a method of 
expansion premised on the notion that “an agrarian empire supported a republican 
political economy better than the urban-dominated manufacturing alternative.”34 One of 
the theory’s most prominent and articulate spokesmen was Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson 
believed that landed expansion was “healthy” because it allowed U.S. citizens to sustain 
agrarian lifestyles.
35 
Farmers and agricultural yeomen were, according to his 
interpretation, the preferred citizenry of a republic because their self-sufficiency 
allowed them to live and think free from the influence and control of employers, 
masters, and corporations. Jefferson envisioned “an empire without a metropolis” in 
which U.S. citizens would spread across the North American continent and settle its 
vacant lands.
36 
They would establish local governments modelled on those of the 
 
 
31 Kalyvas and Katznelson, “The Republic of the Moderns,” 464-65. 
32 Joyce E. Chaplin, “Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History,” Journal of American 
History 89, no. 4 (March 2003), 1432. 
33 Fowler, “Territorial Expansion,” 35. 
34 Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York: Random House, 2010), 389. 
35 Ibid., 391. 
36 Ibid. 
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existing states which, once stabilised and sufficiently populated, would be incorporated 
into the Union. By granting each new territorial addition the same rights held by the 
original states, the federal government would not need to centralise as a means of 
controlling its growing population. Jefferson also stipulated that the republic should 
consist of a racially “homogeneous” citizenry, which he believed would ensure internal 
social harmony and peace.
37 
By growing through these means, Jefferson believed, the 
United States’ capacity for expansion was “illimitable.”38 
 
Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton offered a counter-theory to the agrarian 
expansionist model. They “envisioned qualitative, not just quantitative, progress for 
America.”39 Concerned that rapid landed expansion could jeopardise the stability of the 
Union, they instead advocated the economic, industrial, and commercial diversification 
and development of the United States.
40 
Whig politicians Henry Clay and John Quincy 
Adams adapted this theory into a method and vision for national commercial expansion. 
Though they differed on much of the detail, both envisioned a kind of “American 
system” in which the United States would enjoy paramount economic and ideological 
influence over the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
41 
This would be achieved by 
encouraging all American countries to adopt republican governments in order to infuse 
them with a sense of ideological affinity.  The United States would also promote the 
proliferation of commercial networks and relationships based on free trade and liberal 
enterprise principles throughout the Western Hemisphere. By opening up the markets 
and resources of the region, the United States would be able to develop into a global 
commercial power. Like Jefferson, Adams and Clay also believed that racial 
homogeneity within the United States was preferable in order to maintain domestic 
harmony. While they “emphasized their ideological solidarity” with Spanish America, 
therefore, they did not racially or culturally identify with those nations. 
42
 
Seward drew on both of these theories to inform his own unique method for 
national expansion. Like Jefferson, he advocated that the U.S. “eagle be sent abroad to 
gather in the nations on the American continent,” and anticipated that the United States 
 
 
 
37 Ibid., 396. 
38 Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2000), 1. 
39 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 62. 
40 
Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 22. 
41 Ibid., 75. 
42 Ibid. 
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would one day be coextensive with North America.
43 
He also agreed that this should be 
achieved primarily through the spread of U.S. settlers, principally agriculturalists, who 
would fill out the corners of the region, put the land under cultivation, and establish 
local governments which would one day be incorporated into the Union. Unlike 
Jefferson and many other expansionists, however, Seward had faith in the capacity of 
the non-white peoples of North America to establish, sustain, and participate in 
republican government. He insisted that, through a method termed “osmosis” by 
Seward’s biographer Glyndon G. Van Deusen and “democratic imperialism” by Walter 
Sharrow, the United States should extend its physical boundaries by exposing 
neighbouring nations to the “renovating influence” of the U.S. republic. 44 Inspired and 
encouraged by the U.S. example, Mexicans and Cubans, as well as Canadians, would 
erect their own republics, practice the skill of self-governance and democracy, and at 
some future stage seek admittance into the Union. 
In Seward’s view, therefore, expansion offered U.S. citizens a “powerful 
incentive for reform” as the most effective means of territorial enlargement was the 
qualitative improvement of the U.S. republic.
45 
Seward’s outlook was heavily 
influenced by the tradition of classical liberalism and its convergence with capitalism in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He saw republican government as being well- 
suited to encouraging individual social and economic liberty and supporting a free 
market and liberal trade economy. While he saw the spread of agriculturalists 
throughout the continent as important, therefore, Seward simultaneously championed 
the diversification and development of his nation’s industrial, commercial, and 
manufacturing capabilities. To facilitate this process, he advocated the growth of 
communication and transportation networks across the country and the establishment of 
a national universal education system. These programmes, Seward believed, would lead 
to wealth, social mobility, and equality amongst the people of the United States. He 
predicted that, when combined with the evident political and personal freedom enjoyed 
by U.S. citizens, these achievements would convince neighbouring nations that 
 
 
 
 
43 William H. Seward, “Speech at a Whig Mass Meeting,” Yates County, NY, 29 October 1844, in The 
Works of William H. Seward (WWHS), ed. George E. Baker (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin & 
Company, 1887), 3: 273. 
44 Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 208; 
Sharrow, “William Henry Seward,” 325; Seward, “Henry Clay,” Speech, United States Senate, 30 June 
1852, in WWHS, ed. Baker, 109. 
45 Sharrow, “William Henry Seward,” 327. 
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republican government was the best means of achieving individual and national 
prosperity, security, and liberty. 
Trade, Seward believed, was the “vehicle for the commerce of ideas.”46 To 
 
augment expansion through improving the model of the United States, Seward proposed 
developing his country’s commercial relations with those nations which it sought to 
bring into its Union. He advocated seeking out economic relations with these countries 
based on liberal trade, which he perceived to be the most profitable and effective means 
of developing international commerce. This would open up the markets of neighbouring 
nations to the United States, thereby bolstering the nation’s manufacturing industry and 
giving it access to the natural resources of North America. More importantly, trade and 
cooperative economic relations would expose neighbouring nations to the culture, ideals, 
and principles of the United States and quicken their adoption of republican 
governments. 
 
Seward also believed that in order for the U.S. “eagle” to gather in the nations of 
the continent, the United States must establish relations based on “fair, open, single- 
handed, single-hearted,” non-aggressive, and non-interventionist diplomacy with the 
countries it wished to absorb.
47 
Like Adams, Seward drew a “sharp line between 
intervention and sympathy in behalf of those fighting for freedom.”48   While he 
believed that all the nations of North America were capable of becoming republics, 
Seward nonetheless insisted that Cubans, Mexicans, and Canadians prove themselves to 
be sufficiently practised in the art of self-governance before they became part of the 
United States. If these countries could establish, stabilise, and sustain their own 
republican governments without outside assistance, they could be “received and 
absorbed” into the Union without compromising the harmony and integrity of the 
United States.
49 
Seward also believed that if these countries were ever to willingly seek 
 
admittance into the Union they must first feel a sense of trust and ideological affinity 
with the United States. Gaining these lands through aggressive acquisition ran the risk 
of bringing new peoples into the Union before they were ready to be responsible 
citizens of a republic, and would also eliminate any affection they might have felt 
towards the United States. 
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Seward had ambitions beyond the extension of the United States’ physical 
boundaries. In a vision similar to Clay’s “American system,” he anticipated that at some 
stage all the countries of the Western Hemisphere would be bound together by ties of 
ideological solidarity and commercial activity. Seward anticipated that this could 
largely be achieved through the same methods he advocated for territorial enlargement. 
The example of the United States would encourage all American nations to adopt 
republican governments. Seward, moreover, subscribed to the liberal economic theories 
of Immanuel Kant, Frèdèric Bastiat, and the British Radicals of the nineteenth century 
that republics “were more likely to engage in trade.”50 Once the hemisphere was united 
 
in ideological uniformity, liberal trade between all American nations would follow. 
Markets would open up and flourish across the region, and the movement of goods and 
materials would flow freely. 
This ideologically united and economically integrated Western Hemisphere 
would act as a “solid base” for the United States’ “commercial ascendancy” as a “world 
power.”51 Deriving economic and industrial strength from liberal commercial 
relationships with the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the United States would be in 
a position to participate in global commerce as a dominant world power. The 
ideological and economic integration of the Western Hemisphere, moreover, would 
compel the European imperialist nations to retreat entirely from the region. The United 
States and the European powers could then establish relations based on mutual respect 
for their respective spheres of influence. This would allow them to then cooperate and 
collaborate in international trade, working together to open up areas of common 
commercial interest around the world, such as the Far East. 
Van Deusen describes Seward’s vision as a “vast, federal American empire.”52 
 
The use of the term “empire,” however, is somewhat problematic. Seward’s vision 
involved both formal and informal means of imperialism.
53 
He wished for the extension 
of the United States’ physical boundaries until the nation encompassed the whole of 
North America, and for U.S. cultural and economic penetration of the remaining 
countries of the Western Hemisphere. While the system he envisioned was designed to 
promote liberty and prosperity amongst its members, it would be structured 
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hierarchically. The United States would be the chief economic and commercial 
beneficiary of the system and would hold paramount political and ideological influence 
over the nations collected within it. Seward insisted, however, that the realisation of his 
vision would be peaceful, and that all the countries it incorporated would be willing 
participants. It is therefore necessary to clarify that what Seward envisioned was a 
uniquely American empire, based on free will, liberty, republican principles, and liberal 
trade. 
 
Seward believed that the accomplishment of his vision was “regulated by laws 
higher than the caprice or policy of princes, kings, and states.”54 An interpretation of the 
nature of human progress which had been current since the Age of Enlightenment in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had, due to advances made in Europe and the 
United States in wealth and invention, received impetus during the nineteenth century. 
This interpretation consisted of a “faith in the progressive improvement of the condition 
of mankind.”55 Seward subscribed to this teleological theory and understood it to mean 
that republicanism, which he believed to be the best form of government for providing 
for the safety, prosperity, and liberty of its adherents, would eventually be adopted by 
all nations. He was confident, moreover, that the United States would lead and guide 
this process. “There is a time,” Seward stated, “for colonization, and there is a time for 
independence” in the Western Hemisphere.56 The American Revolution had triggered a 
series of independence movements across the region. The spread of republicanism and 
the ascendancy of the United States as a world power would naturally follow. “It is a 
work,” Seward continued, “that does not go on as broadly and as rapidly as we could 
wish, but it does not go backward.”57 Seward was convinced that his vision for the 
future of his country was inevitable. 
Seward nonetheless believed that progress “came by degrees in a cumulative 
fashion through the process of time.”58 The adoption of republican governments by all 
nations would be achieved in gradual stages, and each nation could experience 
difficulties during the process. The specific destiny of the United States to extend to the 
reaches of North America and hold paramount influence over the rest of the hemisphere 
would be achieved through the work of successive generations which would each 
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contribute to this larger goal. Seward was aware, however, that the prospects and 
opportunities of the Western Hemisphere could seduce his countrymen and cause them 
to act rashly to quicken this process. The work of statesmen, Seward believed, was to 
act as a moderating force, tempering the “popular passions” of the people of the United 
States if needed and urging action when required so that the larger destiny of the nation 
could be achieved peacefully and in stages.
59
 
For Seward, the Mexican War 1846-48 revealed what work needed to be done 
 
before the United States could move on to the next stage of its hemispheric destiny. The 
interests of slaveholders had driven the nation into a war of aggression against a fellow 
republic. Seward perceived that slavery had to be removed from the United States 
before the nation could expand peacefully. Chapter one of this thesis charts how Seward 
saw the fierce sectionalism of the antebellum period as an encouraging sign that social 
and economic forces within the nation were moving against slavery. The outbreak of the 
Civil War, though undesirable, nevertheless signalled to Seward the death knell of 
slavery. Once the conflict was over, the United States would be able to embark on a 
programme of peaceful expansion. When Seward became secretary of state in 1861, 
therefore, he viewed his role as preparing the way for this process. With regard to 
Mexico, he determined to establish a relationship with his country’s southern neighbour 
based on the principles of ideological support and commercial cooperation which he 
believed would facilitate its future incorporation into the United States. 
While Mexico was significant in Seward’s long-term expansionist vision, it was 
the French invasion of that nation in 1862 that moved it to the centre of Seward’s 
wartime expansionist efforts. He was aware that the Mexican republic had made 
advances in recent decades, particularly after the victory of the Liberals over the 
Conservatives in the War of Reform 1857-61. The country remained, however, 
economically unstable and socially fragmented. Mexican Conservatives had long been 
trying to convince the European powers to intervene in their country to help them defeat 
the Liberals, and in 1862 their efforts came to fruition when Napoleon launched an 
invasion to overthrow the Liberal Juárez government and replace it with a monarchy. 
Chapter two examines how Seward saw this crisis as a test of the Mexican peoples’ 
determination and ability to defend their republic. He resolved, therefore, to maintain a 
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strict neutrality towards the conflict, confident that the Mexican republic would be 
preserved without the aid of the United States. 
As the end of the Civil War approached, Seward saw the necessity of 
maintaining U.S. neutrality towards the French invasion as greater than ever. Chapter 
three charts how Seward insisted that by refusing to intervene in Mexico, the United 
States could demonstrate to Mexico, France, and the rest of the world that, rather than 
being the product of the restrictions of the Civil War, its policy o f non-intervention 
would be a defining characteristic of its future approach to foreign relations. From now 
on, the United States would build relations with all countries based on economic 
cooperation and respect. By doing this, Seward aimed to establish permanent changes in 
the United States’ relationships with Mexico and the European powers which would be 
congenial to the long-term accomplishment of his continental and hemispheric vision. 
Throughout the Civil War Seward faced growing domestic opposition to his 
handling of the French invasion of Mexico. Calls from Northern politicians from both 
parties for intervention were based on a fear of “unexceptionalism.” The secession of 
the Southern states 1860-61 and continued instability within the Union throughout the 
Civil War convinced them that the U.S. republic was declining and disintegrating like 
those which had preceded it. In its current state, they believed, the United States was 
particularly vulnerable to a French attack. They advocated military action in Mexico, 
therefore, in order to pre-emptively strike at the French. They also anticipated that in 
doing so, the Lincoln government would be able to reawaken in both Northerners and 
Southerners a sense of their common nationality and fraternity. Military action in 
Mexico, advocates of intervention believed, could end the Civil War. 
The struggle between Seward and his domestic critics over wartime Mexican 
policy reflected a conflict between two fundamentally different outlooks in the 1860s 
regarding the future of the United States. Seward saw the Civil War and the French 
invasion of Mexico as stages of progress which would contribute to the long-term 
accomplishment of his goal to see Mexico incorporated peacefully into the United 
States. His domestic opponents, conversely, were concerned that that United States was 
descending into the type of anarchy which had characterised Mexico for many decades. 
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Chapter One; “A New Era of Things”: U.S. Relations with Mexico at the Outset of the 
 
American Civil War, 1861. 
 
 
 
After weeks of deliberation and debate with his cabinet, President Abraham Lincoln 
finally decided in March 1861 to order the re-provisioning of the garrison stationed at 
Fort Sumter, South Carolina.
60 
Secretary of State William H. Seward was against the 
decision. For months he had been searching for a way to compromise with the seceded 
Southern states. The president’s decision, however, made a peaceful end to the 
secession crisis unlikely. On 6 April 1861, as a Union flotilla departed for Fort Sumter, 
Seward wrote to Thomas Corwin, the newly-appointed U.S. minister to Mexico. Seward 
told Corwin that in light of the impending conflict between the Northern and Southern 
states, his mission in Mexico was “at this juncture ... the most interesting and important 
one within the whole circle of our international relations.”61 
Mexico, Seward perceived, would play an important role in the event of civil 
war in the United States.  If the Lincoln administration blockaded Southern ports, the 
Confederates would likely seek an alliance with the Mexicans as a means of exporting 
their cotton and importing munitions and other materials to support their war effort. 
Even if such an alliance were not made, the unsettled and lawless nature of Mexico’s 
northern frontier meant that this trade could be carried out covertly. The unstable 
condition of Mexico could also “operate as a seduction” to those wanting to gain a 
foothold in the country.
62 
One of the principal reasons for the Southern rebellion, 
 
Seward believed, was the slaveholders’ wish to create a “Golden Circle” of slavery 
across the southern half of the continent. In the event of war in the United States, 
Southern adventurers could take advantage of the disorder to move into Mexico and 
take possession of its territory. The European powers had also long had their eye on 
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Mexico. Seward feared that one of them might form an alliance with the South and then 
“establish a protectorate” over Mexico, allowing it to extend its presence in the Western 
Hemisphere free from Union interference.
63
 
Mexico was important to Seward for another reason. He interpreted the 
impending civil war as the final conflict between two incompatible systems of 
production: slavery and free labour. Convinced of the socially, economically backward, 
and therefore transitory nature of slavery, Seward believed that this conflict would end 
with the demise of the peculiar institution in the United States. In previous decades, the 
issue of slavery had complicated and hindered acts of national territorial expansion. 
Without it, the United States could embark on a career of physical enlargement without 
causing disturbance at home. The country’s government would be free from the control 
of slaveholders and their efforts to push for foreign policies of aggressive territorial 
acquisition. In 1861 Mexico was emerging from its own civil war, led by a Liberal 
administration which wished to model Mexico’s system of government on the U.S. 
republic. Seward saw this as a promising sign of progress and anticipated that once the 
conflict in the United States had been resolved, the absorption of Mexico into the Union 
would soon follow. Throughout 1861 Seward used his influence over relations with 
Mexico to lay the groundwork for the realisation of this long-term goal. 
During the 1850s most Whigs firmly opposed policies for territorial acquisition 
in an effort to bridge the sectional divides which had been inflamed in the United States 
by the Mexican War 1846-48.
64 
Scholars agree that during this time Seward, as senator 
of New York, lent his support principally to policies for federal spending in the South, 
the building of the transcontinental railroad, and the settlement of western lands.
65 
There 
is disagreement amongst historians as to whether these policies reflected Seward’s 
willingness to join his party in abandoning the issue of national territorial extension, or 
if they were part of his continuing expansionist efforts. Van Deusen argues that Seward 
followed a policy of general conciliation in the 1850s.
66 
During previous decades 
Seward had gained a reputation as an anti-slavery radical, yet he was an ambitious 
politician. As such, in the 1850s Seward allegedly followed the Whig Party line and 
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refrained from advocating landed expansion in order to avoid the politically-toxic issue 
of slavery and cultivate a more moderate political image. According to Van Deusen’s 
interpretation, Seward’s support of policies for internal improvements and federal 
spending in the South was designed to make him appear as a “conservative-liberal” and 
thereby further his career.
67
 
 
Seward was certainly an ambitious politician. Van Deusen’s argument that 
political expediency alone shaped his actions in the 1850s, however, ignores the fact 
that the policies of apparent conciliation which Seward followed were consistent with 
the unique method of national expansion which he had been developing throughout his 
career. Sharrow notes that Seward advocated policies for land settlement and the 
construction of railroads in order to encourage U.S. settlers to “form new states from the 
 
American territories” and with the “combined influences of commerce, American 
settlers abroad, and the freely expressed desires of alien peoples ... add foreign areas to 
the United States.”68 Immerman agrees with Sharrow and adds that Seward also aimed 
to expand his nation’s commercial capabilities during this period. In the 1850s the 
untapped markets and resources of East Asia were the focal point of the world powers’ 
commercial ambitions. Seward knew that the United States would have to act quickly to 
prevent the region being cut off to it by the European powers. Immerman argues that 
Seward’s support of policies for landed settlement, the improvement of national 
communication and transportation networks, and the stimulation of underdeveloped 
regions of the United States were designed to improve the country’s economic, 
industrial, and therefore commercial capabilities.
69
 
This chapter shows that Seward did not give up expansionism during the 1850s. 
 
It also explains why he deviated from the Whig Party line during this period, a question 
which has not been sufficiently addressed by Immerman or Sharrow. Seward believed 
that all forms of national expansion and development – the spread of U.S. settlers across 
the continent, the proliferation of U.S.-inspired governmental institutions across the 
Western Hemisphere, and the extension of U.S. commerce throughout the world – were 
part of an inevitable, unstoppable, and even preordained process. He therefore saw 
Whig and then Republican efforts to stymie and prevent these advances as futile. 
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Instead, during the 1850s Seward sought to channel and guide national expansionist 
impulses into what he saw as the most profitable and peaceful routes. 
Born in Florida, New York, Seward practised law until entering politics in 1830 
when he was elected to the New York state senate as an Anti-Mason. In 1833 he joined 
the Whig Party and in 1838 was elected governor of New York. During his time in state 
politics Seward followed the Whig programme of “economic diversity and cultural 
uniformity.”70 This involved encouraging the development of all areas of national 
 
economic and industrial production, as well as cultivating amongst the population 
adherence to shared values and principles. By doing so, Seward and his fellow Whigs 
believed that national prosperity and economic advancement could be achieved while 
maintaining domestic social harmony. 
In order to achieve “cultural uniformity,” as governor Seward proposed the 
establishment of a board of education in New York, the inclusion of the children of all 
immigrants into the education system, and the improvement of the curricula in state 
schools and colleges.
71 
He believed that all children should be taught an “enlightened 
understanding of responsible citizenship,” including the functions of the nation’s 
governmental institutions and the expectations placed on them as citizens of a 
democratic republic.
72 
As Seward stated in 1839, by imbuing in all U.S. citizens an 
“undoubted loyalty ... toward the institutions” of “republican America,” the education 
system could guarantee the nation domestic tranquillity even as it brought in peoples 
from diverse backgrounds.
73 
Seward also anticipated that universal education could 
instil in the population a form of “virtue,” which he defined as an awareness of the need 
constantly to improve the republic. Seward feared that as the United States grew in 
wealth, his countrymen could become infused with “an undue feeling of contentment 
and self-complacency.”74 By teaching them to “cherish the legacy of their republican 
heritage” and the importance of the U.S. republic to human history and development, 
the education system could instil in U.S. citizens a sense of the need to continuously 
 
improve their republic so that it could fulfil its role.
75 
A virtuous citizenry would be able 
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to guard against “vice, luxury, and corruption” as the United States continued to 
 
develop, improve, expand, and grow wealthy.
76
 
 
Seward also followed “the policy of our ancestors, which freely opened our ports 
and offered an asylum to the exiles of every land.”77 Mass immigration to the United 
States increased rapidly in the 1830s, with roughly 50,000 immigrants entering the 
country each year.
78 
Most came from Ireland, Germany, and Central Europe. Seward 
encouraged this movement and advocated the speedy inclusion and assimilation of all 
foreigners. He encouraged them to “disperse themselves over the country” and settle 
unused lands to give strength to national agricultural production and enable the 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources.79 Seward also anticipated that 
immigrants who settled in cities would supply necessary manpower to the country’s 
industrial production. Immigrants, he believed, would play a vital role in the economic, 
industrial, and commercial advancement of the United States. 
To facilitate land settlement and industrial development, Seward supported the 
growth of a “system of internal improvements by means of railroads and canals” which 
would “enable all the different sections of the country to enjoy, as equally as possible, a 
speedy communication” with one another.80 He believed that transportation networks 
would encourage the movement of settlers into new lands and also improve the nation’s 
internal trade. Northern and Northwestern farmers, for instance, could grow foodstuffs 
such as livestock and cereals which would in turn allow Southern farmers to concentrate 
on specialised crops for exportation. Transportation networks, moreover, would further 
the exploitation and movement of the nation’s natural resources which could then be 
exported or used to fuel the domestic manufacturing industry. 
“Home industry,” Seward insisted, must be encouraged and have “equal 
advantages” with other areas of national production through protective tariffs which 
would ensure that U.S. markets were not flooded with foreign manufactured goods.
81
 
Seward favoured liberalism in international trade. He was aware, however, that the 
 
United States would first have to use protective tariffs to allow its manufact uring 
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industry to grow if it were ever to become a truly global commercial power. He also 
believed that by encouraging domestic industry, the United States would be able to 
bring in foreign capital and investment “in those places where domestic capital is most 
liberally and profitably employed.”82 His domestic agenda amounted to a scheme in 
which all of the nation’s regions, industries, and systems of production were supported, 
protected, and encouraged to improve. 
Seward was a staunch opponent of slavery and during the 1830s and 40s he 
gained a reputation as a prominent anti-slavery politician.
83 
His hostility towards the 
institution stemmed to a large degree from his commitment to national social and 
economic integration and development. Slaveholders’ undue influence in Congress, 
derived principally from the three-fifths law, allowed them to enact policies which 
benefitted their region at the expense of true comprehensive national development. The 
slaveholders’ “false free-trade system,” for instance, which was designed to support the 
exportation of Southern cotton and other slave-grown materials, meant that the U.S. 
market was saturated with European-manufactured goods. This left domestic 
“productions without adequate reward,” thereby stifling the nation’s manufacturing 
industry.
84 
Low tariffs for the benefit of slaveholders also limited sources of revenue for 
the Southern states. This forced them to maintain high levels of debt and taxation, 
“prostrating government credit, and driving states to insolvency.”85 Lack of revenue, 
Seward argued, meant that slavery “impoverished the states where it exists so much, 
that they are incapable of endowing schools, maintaining mails, constructing roads, or 
supporting armies.”86 By refusing to let their exports compete in a truly free market, 
moreover, slaveholders kept the price of their cotton artificially high. Southern planters 
felt no pressure to improve the efficiency of their system of production and 
consequently slavery was a “waste of the national domain.”87 In short, Seward believed 
slavery hindered the nation’s ability to develop economically. 
Members of the Liberty Party, founded by abolitionists in 1839, urged Seward to 
run for Congress in 1842 and appealed to him to be their candidate in the 1844 
presidential election. Rising antislavery politician Salmon P. Chase avowed that Seward 
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would be the right candidate for the Liberty Party in the 1848 presidential election.
88
 
 
Seward, however, consistently refused their appeals and insisted that he would remain 
loyal to the Whigs, even supporting slaveholders Henry Clay and General Zachary 
Taylor for the presidency in 1844 and 1848 respectively. Seward’s refusal to join the 
abolitionists was due to his belief in the inevitable fall of slavery. “The laws of political 
economy,” he stated in 1844, “combining with the inevitable tendencies of population, 
are hastening emancipation, and all the labors of statesmen and politicians to prevent it 
are ineffectual.”89 
 
Although cotton production and the exportation of other slave-grown goods 
 
were thriving throughout the 1840s, other aspects of U.S. industry were also developing. 
In the North and Northwest foodstuffs such as livestock and cereals were growing in 
abundance. Transportation and communication networks were opening up new regions 
for cultivation and raw materials for exploitation, fuelling an internal trade which 
benefitted Northern industry and manufacturing. By 1840 total national exports 
amounted to $132 million and imports $107 million. On a global level, Seward saw 
encouraging signs that the world powers were moving towards economic integration 
and liberal trade. In 1846, for instance, the British parliament voted in favour of 
repealing the Corn Laws and in 1851 the submarine telegraph cable was laid under the 
English Channel, linking the financial markets of London, Paris, and other European 
capitals.
90 
Seward believed that as the U.S. and world economies became more 
 
diversified and integrated, slavery would be exposed to market forces. The 
inefficiencies of the institution would render it unable to compete and keep up with 
these national and global developments. For the same reasons that Seward opposed 
slavery – namely, because it was a backward system of production which inhibited 
national development – he also believed its days were numbered. 
Seward’s conviction in the ultimate demise of slavery removed any sense of 
urgency from the means he proposed to eradicate it. The forces of international trade, 
domestic industrial development, and social enlightenment would ensure that the 
peculiar institution would eventually become obsolete. Accordingly, Seward believed 
supporting the Whig Party, which encouraged these forces through policies of industrial 
growth and economic diversification, was the best means of achieving emancipation 
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peacefully. In the meantime, Seward advised, politicians could facilitate the process by 
enfranchising free blacks (albeit with a property qualification), limiting the internal 
slave trade, resisting “unceasingly the admission of slave states,” and urging abolition in 
the District of Columbia.
91 
Through the application of these measures, Seward insisted, 
“the obstacles in the way of emancipation will no longer appear insurmountable.”92 
In 1842 Seward left the governorship and spent some time out of office. He 
commented frequently on political events, however, and during the late 1840s he joined 
his fellow Whigs in condemning the Mexican War. The Whigs’ principal complaint was 
that the war was prosecuted for the purpose of extending slavery, yet they also 
expressed other objections regarding the conflict. President James K. Polk’s means of 
instigating the war, for instance, struck Seward and other Whigs as a dangerous abuse 
of constitutional power. As Seward asked at a Whig mass meeting in 1848, “Is the war 
itself just? Who provoked, and by what unpardonable offence?”93   Another complaint 
was the cost of the conflict. Warfare, Seward noted in his speech, required “new loans 
and levies” to be waged on U.S. citizens and channelled funds away from programmes 
for national economic, social, and commercial development.
94 
Perhaps most worryingly, 
 
Seward concluded, the war against Mexico was “scandalous to democratic 
institutions.”95 By waging war against a fellow republic for the purposes of territorial 
gain, the United States was contradicting its own principles of self-governance and 
liberty. 
 
Whigs had long preferred commercial and industrial development over territorial 
extension as a means of national advancement. The virulent sectionalism which swept 
across the country in response to the Mexican War, however, pushed many towards a 
more staunch anti-territory position. During the 1850s most Whigs openly rejected 
“expansion and a too rapid growth of territory” in an effort to avoid the divisive issue of 
slavery and heal the sectional splits wrought within both their party and nation.
96
 
Seward, however, was not among them. In February 1849 he was elected senator for 
New York. During his first two years in the Senate the principal question facing U.S. 
politicians was what would be the future of slavery in the lands of the Mexican Cession. 
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With a view to settling the issue, Whig senator Henry Clay from Kentucky presented a 
series of resolutions to the Senate on 29 January 1850 which provided for no restrictions 
on slavery in the organisation of this new territory. On 11 March 1850 Seward delivered 
a speech to the Senate outlining both why he was firmly opposed to any compro mise 
which would provide for the extension of slavery into any new lands, and why he would 
not join his fellow Whigs in their anti-territory position as a means of encouraging 
domestic harmony. 
Seward began his speech by noting that the “fierce conflict of parties that we are 
seeing and hearing” was the result of the “moral question” of slavery “transcending the 
too narrow creeds of parties.”97 Slavery and freedom were incompatible systems of 
labour which were destined to collide as the nation became more socially and 
economically integrated. Seward viewed the sectionalism growing within the country as 
indicating that the United States had “arrived at that stage of national progress when 
that crisis” between slavery and freedom was “directly before us.”98 He was certain 
 
about the outcome of this final conflict. “Slavery,” Seward proclaimed, “is only a 
temporary, accidental” institution which was “incongruous” to the interests and 
character of the United States. Freedom, meanwhile, was a “perpetual, organic, 
universal” system of labour.99 Echoing the arguments he had made as governor, Seward 
insisted that because slavery was an inefficient and backward institution, it could not 
hope to survive in a nation which was rapidly progressing towards a state of social 
enlightenment and economic and commercial advancement. Indeed Seward saw the 
virulence of slaveholders in the 1850 Compromise debates as indicating “on which side 
the balance is inclining ... the slave states have always been losing political power, and 
they always will be while they have any to lose.”100 
Seward was therefore able to find cause for optimism in the fierce debates taking 
 
place across the country. The work of emancipation was underway, and while Seward 
conceded that “I do not say that there may not be disturbance,” he was nonetheless 
cheered by the evident progress the nation was making towards emancipation.
101
 
Seward believed, moreover, that the current period of sectionalism was “premonitory” 
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of the nation’s “restoration, with new elements of health and vigor to be imbibed from 
that spirit of the age which is so justly called Progress.”102 Once the conflict between 
slavery and freedom had been decided, the nation could achieve true social and 
economic integration. 
Seward did not share the concerns of his fellow Whigs that sectionalism was 
threatening to destroy the country. Nor did he agree with the policy of no-territory as a 
means of maintaining its unity. To Seward the notion that politicians in Washington 
D.C. could limit and restrain national expansion was absurd. “We have taken a 
breathing spell,” he told the Senate, “from the annexation of territory to divide the gains. 
The division once made, no matter how, the national instinct … will hurry us on in a 
career that presents scarcely formidable obstacles.”103 “Our pioneers are already abroad 
in those inviting regions,” he continued, “our capital is making passages through them 
 
from ocean to ocean; and within ten years those passages will be environed by 
 
American communities, surpassing in power and wealth, if not in numbers, the unsettled 
and unenterprising states now existing here.”104 The spread of U.S. settlers, capital, and 
commerce across the continent was an unstoppable process dictated by the laws of 
human ambition, economic development, and national destiny. Attempts to halt these 
movements would be unsuccessful. As historian Major L. Wilson puts it, Seward never 
abandoned expansionism because he believed his country “did not have much choice in 
the matter.”105 
The Mexican War, however, had demonstrated to Seward the destructive effects 
of the slaveholders’ preferred form of expansion and the danger of allowing them to 
continue these policies unchecked. Slaveholders, he told the Senate, had been “misled 
by a new and profitable culture” which caused them to demand more territory for 
slavery regardless of the fact that their institution inhibited true national social and 
economic integration and development.
106 
The natural “popular passion” for expansion 
 
had been misguided by slavery.
107 
Seward believed that “the real task of statesmen was 
 
not to resist this passion,” which was organic and unavoidable, “but to give orderly 
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expression to it.”108 He therefore resolved to channel these “passions” into more 
 
profitable and productive forms of national growth and expansion. 
 
Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois managed to get Clay’s 1850 
proposal passed in Congress through a series of piecemeal bills. In these bills, popular 
sovereignty was to decide whether slavery would be permitted in New Mexico and Utah. 
Slaveholders were pessimistic about their institution taking root in these lands, however, 
and throughout the 1850s they continued to push for further territorial additions to the 
country.  In the run-up to the 1852 presidential election the “spread-eagled nationalism” 
of the “Young America” element of the Democratic Party made Cuba an important 
campaign issue.
109 
After his election, Democratic president Franklin Pierce instructed 
his minister to Spain, Pierre Soulè, to negotiate the purchase of Cuba from Spain. The 
 
scheme collapsed, however, when Soulè’s Ostend Manifesto came to public light in 
 
October 1854 and caused outrage in Madrid.
110
 
 
Attention also frequently centred on Mexico.
111 
After the signing of the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 disputes between the United States and Mexico 
continued, principally regarding the ownership of the Mesilla Valley. U.S. interest in 
the region stemmed from the need to find viable routes for railroads to connect the 
Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States. For these same reasons many U.S. 
politicians also advocated acquiring the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexican president 
Mariano Arista had given Mexican promoter Don Josè de Garay permission to build 
colonies for U.S. settlers on the Isthmus using funds from the Tehuantepec Railroad 
Company of New Orleans. When Juan Bautista Ceballos succeeded Arista as president 
in January 1853, however, he revoked the contract, fearing that settlers on the Isthmus 
would rebel and detach the region from Mexico as the Texans had done in 1835. 
Ceballos’ decision provoked an angry reaction from the Tehuantepec Railroad 
Company of New Orleans as well as U.S. investors, and the issue was eventually 
discussed in Congress. In February 1853 Seward addressed the Senate to express his 
opposition to the company’s claims. He viewed the affair as an attempt by Southern 
expansionists to interfere in and destabilise areas of Mexico in order to bring about their 
annexation to the United States. Seward was in favour of the absorption of Mexico into 
the U.S. republic. In the wake of the Mexican War, however, he believed more firmly 
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than ever that policies of forced acquisition were not the way to achieve this goal. 
Instead he proposed a method of expansion which was peaceful, gradual, and, in his 
mind, beneficial to both the U.S. and Mexican people. 
Seward was convinced that Mexicans were capable of self-government. The 
success of the U.S. republic in comparison to that of Mexico was, he argued, the result 
of circumstance rather than the racial characteristics of their respective populations. 
Under British rule, Seward stated, American colonists had learnt how to participate in 
“fixed, domestic, constitutional, representative systems and habits of government” 
which “rested upon the foundations of popular education, freedom of the press, 
toleration of conscience, and, above all, upon the sacredness … of the rights of trial by 
jury, and habeas corpus.”112 Mexico, by contrast, had been ruled by the Spanish 
 
“despotic power.”113 Under Spanish rule Mexicans had been left “ignorant of any 
 
system or principle of representative legislation, or freedom of the press, or of toleration 
 
of religion, or of guaranties of personal liberty.”114 
 
The American Revolution, Seward continued, had nonetheless “fostered a spirit 
of revolt” amongst Mexicans and in 1810 they had begun their own war for 
independence.
115 
In 1824 Mexico adopted a constitution based on the model of the 
United States. Since that time Mexico had been “rent often and in every part by the 
struggle between the North American principle of federalism, and its antagonist, the 
European principle of centralism.”116 At the time Seward was speaking Mexico was still 
in what historians term the “Age of Santa Anna.”117 The country lacked central 
authority and state governors often enjoyed semi-autonomous control over their regions. 
In the 1830s several states had rebelled and formed their own governments, including 
the Republic of the Rio Grande, the Republic of Yucatan, and the Republic of Texas, 
although Texas was the only one to succeed in gaining independence. Coups by 
ambitious politicians and military leaders, rather than popular elections, often decided 
presidents. Santa Anna, who ruled Mexico in 1853, had repealed the 1824 Constitution, 
dissolved Congress, and formed a dictatorial, Catholic regime.
118
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Seward believed that despite the difficulties they had experienced since 
independence, Mexicans “will bear no government but a federal one.”119 While Mexico 
was plagued with domestic instability, economic uncertainty, and despotic military- 
backed rulers, elements of democratic activity did exist within its system of government. 
Although Mexico’s presidents were often decided by military coups, “the whole 
structure of government at national, provincial and municipal levels was based on a 
representative system.”120 Elections for legislatures and local councils were regular. 
Conservatives, who were backed by the Catholic Church, generally favoured centralised 
forms of government. There were, however, significant numbers of Liberals who 
advocated “equal rights and guarantees for all citizens, administration within the clearly 
defined limits of the law, and the principle of state autonomy as long as the states did 
not interfere with the rights and general interests of the republic.”121 Seward was certain 
 
that before long these Liberals would take control of the government, stabilise Mexico, 
and establish a functioning democratic republic. 
Seward thought it essential that the United States allow the Mexican republic 
time to stabilise before bringing it into the Union. In the 1830s and 40s he had 
expressed the opinion that free African Americans, who were often ex-slaves or had 
otherwise been deprived of educational opportunities, must prove themselves 
sufficiently “uplifted” by passing a property qualification before they could vote.122 
 
Similarly, Seward believed that due to their lack of experience with democratic 
institutions, Mexicans also had to prove themselves capable being citizens of the U.S. 
republic. This could be done through their successful stabilisation of their republic, 
which would demonstrate that they were committed to the principles of republicanism 
and capable of sustaining them. Only then could Mexico, “with her one million of 
whites, her two millions of mixed races, and her five millions of Aztecs and other 
aboriginals ... be received and absorbed” into the United States “without disturbing 
national harmony, impairing the national vigor, and even checking, for a day, the 
national progress.”123 
Seward’s method for the future absorption of Mexico also rested on his belief 
that the Mexicans would willingly join the Union. He had several reasons for 
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anticipating this. He firmly believed that wherever the influence of the U.S. republic 
was felt, “desire for protection under those institutions is awakened.”124 The shared 
values of the two countries would create an affinity between their people. Mexicans, 
moreover, would feel grateful and loyal to the United States as the country which had 
guided them through their journey towards becoming a republic. These bonds would be 
strengthened by the continuous flow of U.S. settlers into Mexico.  Seward also believed 
that the Mexicans would see the economic advantages of becoming part of the United 
States. By entering the Union, Mexicans could share in the benefits of U.S. industrial 
and economic power. Finally, Seward put his faith in the somewhat vague yet 
significant notion that the North American continent defined the natural boundaries of 
the U.S. republic. The incorporation of Mexico into the United States, Seward told the 
Senate, was inevitable, and soon Mexico “shall implore you to give her ... safety by 
admitting her to your confederacy, as before long, in any event, she surely must and will 
do. That time is coming soon.”125 
Inevitability, however, did not mean passivity.
126 
Throughout the 1850s Seward 
 
proposed and supported a variety of policies designed to bring about his plan for 
continental territorial expansion. He submitted resolutions proposing that land grants be 
given to refugees of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and supported the passage of the 
Grow Bill, which was designed to encourage the settlement of western lands. Seward 
encouraged these measures to “facilitate the most rapid peopling of American territory” 
and thereby “allow peaceful American expansion beyond her present borders.”127 He 
 
also made substantial efforts towards national commercial development, introducing a 
resolution for the survey of the Arctic and Pacific oceans to aid the whaling industry 
and encourage U.S. trade in East Asia. Seward also tried to convince President Millard 
Fillmore to purchase the commercially important Sandwich Islands and advocated 
government subsidising of the Collins’ Overland Project.128 He continued to refute 
schemes of conquest, moreover, and insisted that the United States build relations with 
neighbouring nations including Mexico based on “fair, open diplomacy” to further 
national economic and territorial interests.
129
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Having established himself during the 1850s as one of the leaders of the 
 
Republican Party, Seward believed by 1860 that the presidency was within his grasp. 
130
 
 
Despite his experience and the efforts of his political manager Thurlow Weed, however, 
 
Seward’s bid for the Republican nomination was unsuccessful. The Chicago 
Convention nominated Abraham Lincoln instead, and in November 1860 the one-term 
representative from Illinois won the election and became president-elect of the United 
States. Soon after his election victory Lincoln wrote to Seward offering him the post of 
secretary of state. In his letter, Lincoln noted that Seward’s “position in the public eye, 
your integrity, ability, learning and great experience” would make him an invaluable 
member of the cabinet.
131 
Seward, still bruised at having lost out at the nomination but 
drawn to the possibilities for influence over policy which the role of secretary would 
bring, accepted. 
Lincoln’s election triggered the secession of the Southern states from the Union. 
During the crisis Seward played a key role in searching for a compromise which would 
bring these states back into the Union and avoid war. He was part of a Senate committee 
charged with the task of considering various compromise proposals and gave his 
endorsement to several, one of which called for a thirteenth amendment to the 
Constitution to guarantee slavery in existing states against future interference by the 
federal government.  Seward also attended a peace convention in Washington on 4 
February 1861. None of the seceded states attended and five Northern states also failed 
to do so. The debates were “aimless or acrimonious” and the participation of many 
Republicans was either “perfunctory or hostile.”132 After three weeks the convention 
produced a modified Crittenden Compromise which stated that the 36° 30’ line would 
only apply to present territory and that a majority vote from both free and slave states 
would be necessary for the admission of any new territory. When the proposal went 
before Congress it “suffered an unceremonious defeat, mainly by Republican votes.”133 
Seward’s conciliation efforts during the secession crisis 1860-61 were a stark 
contrast to the vehement no-compromise stance he had adopted towards slavery in the 
1850s. His efforts to persuade both Northerners and Southerners to accept compromise 
 
showed his willingness to make concessions which would see slavery preserved and 
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even extended in the Union. There was, however, consistency in Seward’s actions. They 
were based on his “faith in the power” of freedom over slavery. 134 In the 1840s Seward 
had chosen to remain loyal to the Whigs rather than join the Liberty Party because he 
was convinced that the Whigs encouraged the social and economic forces which would 
bring about the end of slavery through natural, peaceful means. A similar viewpoint 
directed his response to the secession crisis. He was willing to make short-term 
concessions to slaveholders in order to preserve the country which he believed would, 
in time, abandon slavery as an economically inefficient and socially backward 
institution. In 1850, moreover, Seward had not seriously believed the unity of the Union 
to be at stake. In 1860 he was willing to compromise with slaveholders because, like 
many other politicians, Seward insisted that the survival of the U.S. republic was 
paramount. 
One of Seward’s last conciliation efforts also revealed the doubts he harboured 
regarding Lincoln’s leadership abilities. On 1 April 1861 Seward sent Lincoln a memo 
entitled “Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration.” A month had passed, 
Seward noted, since the president’s inauguration without any definite foreign or 
domestic policy having been decided upon by the cabinet. Seward went on to propose, 
among other things, that the Union abandon Fort Sumter as an act of conciliation to the 
South and a last-ditch effort to avert war between the states. By implying that he, 
Seward, should take direction of the nation’s policy, “the memo reflected Seward’s lack 
of confidence” in Lincoln and his persisting resentment at having lost out on the 
Republican nomination.
135 
Lincoln replied to the memo the same day and “served notice” 
 
to Seward “kindly but firmly, that he was the master in his own house.”136 
 
Lincoln and Seward collaborated with greater success in staffing the State 
Department. This was Seward’s first substantial act in shaping the purpose and nature of 
U.S. foreign policy under his stewardship. Carl Schurz, a German-born anti-slavery 
Republican, was appointed minister to Spain. Lincoln had originally preferred William 
L. Dayton for the post of minister to Great Britain, but Seward persuaded the president 
to send Charles Francis Adams, son of the secretary’s political mentor John Quincy 
 
Adams, to London instead.
137 
Dayton, who in 1856 had beaten Lincoln to the 
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Republican Party’s vice-presidential nomination, was appointed minister to France. 
Representative Thomas Corwin from Ohio, who had been an outspoken critic of the 
Mexican War, was chosen as minister to Mexico. This decision by Seward was 
significant in its evident design to convey a gesture of goodwill to the Mexican republic. 
On 6 April 1861 Seward sent his first letter of instruction to Corwin. He began 
by noting “the pleasure” which the Lincoln government felt in witnessing the recent 
events which had occurred in Mexico.
138 
Less than four months earlier the civil war in 
Mexico fought between Liberal and Conservative factions had come to an end. The 
Liberals had triumphed and established a government headed by President Benito 
Juárez. The Juárez administration’s agenda was based on the Liberals’ July 1859 
manifesto. This manifesto endorsed the “separation of church and state,” the 
nationalisation of the clergy’s wealth, the nationwide establishment of primary and 
secondary schools, and freedom of the press.
139 
In order to bring more land under 
cultivation, the Liberals also pledged to modernise Mexico’s roads, reduce the price of 
land, fund the construction of railroads, and encourage immigration by granting 
foreigners Mexican citizenship upon their arrival to the country. The manifesto also 
promised to “stimulate foreign commerce by simplifying the commercial regulations 
established under existing laws and by reducing taxes.”140 
The Liberals had mixed feelings regarding the United States. In light of the 
 
events of recent decades, they were “concerned about continuing expansionist pressures 
by the United States” and were fearful that it would seek to “exploit Mexico’s chronic 
internal disorder” as the nation recovered from its recent war.141 Much of the Liberals’ 
programme for the economic, social, and political development of Mexico, however, 
“drew its inspiration from the U.S. model.”142 Indeed, the Liberals’ domestic agenda 
sought to “beat the United States at its own game.”143 By stabilising and strengthening 
their country through these methods, Liberals hoped to protect Mexico from future U.S. 
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incursions. They also wished to convince the United States to see their country as a 
sister republic, rather than a failed state ripe for territorial conquest. 
In January 1861 Mexican chargé d’affaires to the United States Matias Romero 
had visited Lincoln. Romero began the meeting by informing Lincoln that the Juárez 
government “had viewed the recent triumph of Republican ideas in this country with 
satisfaction.”144 The chargé then expressed his government’s hope that “the policy of 
the Republican administration with regard to Mexico” would be “truly fraternal and not 
guided by the egotistic and antihumanitarian principles which the Democratic 
administration had pursued in respect to Mexico.”145  Romero concluded by noting that 
the United States and Mexico were “travelling the same path” of republicanism and 
should therefore support and encourage one another’s success.146 
Seward’s 6 April letter to Corwin contained a similar sentiment regarding the 
future of the U.S.-Mexican relationship. The secretary noted that the establishment of 
the Lincoln administration marked the “inauguration of a new condition of things” in 
U.S. Mexican policy.
147 
The United States did not wish to acquire any more Mexican 
territory and indeed was convinced that the “safety, welfare, and happiness” of both 
countries would be “more effectively promoted” if Mexico “should retain its complete 
integrity and independence.”148 Instead, the Lincoln administration wished to establish a 
 
relationship with its southern neighbour based on “commercial and conventional amity” 
which would be “directly conducive to the prosperity and happiness of both nations, and 
ultimately auspicious to all other republican States throughout the world.”149 
Seward noted, however, that there would be boundaries in this new relationship. 
While pleased with the Liberals’ victory in the War of Reform, he was aware that 
Mexico had not yet completely stabilised. Conservatives were still a powerful element 
in Mexican society. Many state governors, such as Santiago Vidaurr i of Nuevo Leon, 
remained largely outside the control of the federal government. The country’s debt, 
moreover, was large due to the international loans taken out by Conservative and 
Liberal factions during the civil war. Seward instructed Corwin to impress upon the 
 
Mexicans that “the surest guaranty of their safety” lay in the “ability of the government 
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and people of Mexico to preserve and maintain the integrity and the sovereignty” of 
their own country.
150   
While they could rely on the ideological support and commercial 
cooperation of the United States, the Mexicans could not depend on unlimited or 
unconditional U.S. assistance to sustain their republic. 
The relationship Seward laid out to Corwin was based on the principles the 
secretary had outlined in the 1850s for guiding U.S. relations with Mexico. He viewed 
the Liberal triumph in the War of Reform and the Juárez government’s agenda for 
Mexican development as signs that Mexico was progressing. Indeed, as Seward stated 
to Corwin, he was now convinced that the “republican system is to pass safely through 
all ordeals and prove a success” in Mexico.151 The secretary therefore sought to build a 
relationship with Mexico based on ideological fraternity, commercial collaboration, and 
 
a mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty as a means of encouraging the Mexican 
republic to stabilise and flourish. What Seward did not reveal to the Juárez government 
was that the long-term objective of the relationship he was proposing was to facilitate 
the advancement of the Mexican republic until it was ready to be incorporated into the 
United States. 
Corwin’s communications to the Mexican government were well received. By 
the summer of 1861 he was able to report to Seward that the Juárez government 
“regards the United States as its true and only reliable friend ... That this should be so is 
somewhat remarkable, when we regard the deep prejudices engendered in the general 
Mexican mind by the loss of Texas ... and the compulsory cession of territory which 
was a consequence of our war with them.”
152 
Positive developments in the U.S.- 
 
Mexican relationship followed. When the Mexican government suggested “negotiating 
a new and beneficial treaty with the United States,” Seward granted Corwin “liberal 
instructions and ample power to negotiate” a U.S. loan to the Juárez government to 
bolster Mexico’s economy.153 In August the Juárez administration gave permission for 
Union troops to enter Guayamas and cross Mexican territory to access Arizona from the 
south. The Mexican government explained that they had allowed this as “proof of their 
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sincere desire” to “draw closer the relations of friendship which happily exist” between 
 
Mexico and the United States.
154
 
 
When Confederate agent John K. Pickett arrived in Mexico in early 1861 his 
overtures were firmly rebuffed by the Juárez government.
155 
This was welcome news to 
Seward as other Southern diplomatic ventures had been more successful. In February 
1861 Confederate president Jefferson Davis created a three man commission with 
instructions to persuade the governments of the European powers to recognise the South 
as an independent nation. The Confederacy’s diplomatic strategy was principally based 
on the notion that the European powers would grant it recognition out of economic 
necessity.
156 
Europe’s textile industries were largely dependent on Southern cotton. The 
Confederates believed that the Europeans would recognise them and possibly even 
intervene in the Civil War in order to gain access to this cotton. This notion appeared to 
have some ground when, following Lincoln’s proclamation in April of a Union 
blockade of Southern ports, Britain and France announced their neutrality towards the 
conflict in the United States and thereby tacitly recognised the status of the South as a 
belligerent. This acknowledged the Union and Confederacy as two entities at war and 
gave equal rights to their ships in British and French ports. This was a serious blow to 
the Lincoln government, which feared that the Europeans’ recognition of Confederate 
independence would soon follow. 
During the latter half of 1861 international events brought Mexico to the centre 
of the Union’s concerns regarding European interference in the Civil War. In the 
summer the Mexican economy reached a crisis point and on 17 July Juárez was 
compelled to declare the suspension of the payments of interest on his country’s foreign 
debts. Mexico’s principal creditors, Great Britain, France, and Spain, were three of 
Europe’s most powerful imperialist nations.157 Corwin believed that direct action was 
 
needed to avert a conflict between Mexico and its creditors. On 29 July he wrote to 
Seward suggesting that the United States offer to pay three percent of the interest ($2 
million a year) of Mexico’s foreign debts for a period of five years. As a guarantee, he 
suggested, Mexico could mortgage land in its western states. 
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On 2 September Seward replied to Corwin’s proposal. The United States would 
agree to the loan, he stated, as long as Mexico would repay the debt within six years at a 
rate of six percent interest. If Mexico failed to do so, the United States would receive 
the states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinola. Seward’s final 
stipulation was that before any money changed hands, Great Britain, France, and Spain 
would all have to endorse the agreement. Seward knew that the Juárez government 
would never sign a treaty which could potentially lead to such a substantial loss of 
territory. Nor did Seward think it likely that the European creditors would agree to the 
plan. Indeed, Seward outlined these requirements to ensure that no such treaty was 
made.
158 
In May he had given Corwin permission to negotiate a loan with the Juárez 
government to stabilise Mexico’s economy. Juárez’s suspension of payments, however, 
had altered circumstances greatly. The European creditors had a legitimate grievance 
against Mexico. Any action by the United States to aid the Juárez government could be 
seen by the European powers as an act against them. This in turn could trigger the 
recognition of the Confederacy by one of the Europeans. Seward continued to appear to 
consider the possibility of a loan, however, as a show of sympathy to the Mexicans. 
Throughout this period the “only safe passage along the bandit-infested road 
 
between Vera Cruz” and Mexico City was a monthly escorted British courier.159 
 
Communications between Washington D.C. and the Mexican capital were therefore 
slow. As Corwin waited for Seward’s reply to his proposed treaty he grew increasingly 
fearful that one or all of the European creditors planned to take military action against 
Mexico. He began to discuss another plan with the Juárez government. This time 
Corwin suggested that the United States give Mexico a direct loan of between $5-10 
million. The purpose of this loan would be to give Mexico an injection of money so that 
it could organise its defences. On 7 September Corwin wrote a dispatch to Seward 
outlining this scheme, and on 2 October the secretary replied. This time Seward flatly 
refused Corwin’s proposal, noting that the Union could not afford such an expense at a 
time when it was mobilising its own military forces.
160 
As Seward well knew, a direct 
 
loan to Mexico would be a blatant act of partiality on the part of the Union against the 
 
Europeans. 
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In October representatives of Great Britain, France, and Spain convened in 
London to decide on a course of action regarding Mexico. On 31 October all three 
nations signed the Treaty of London. The Treaty bound the signatories in a joint venture 
to Mexico to negotiate with the Juárez government and bring about the 
recommencement of payments.  Each of the European nations agreed to contribute a 
small portion of their armies or navies to add weight to their demands. A clause was 
drawn up in the Treaty, however, which specifically forbade any of the signatories from 
interfering in Mexico’s form of government. A portion of the Spanish navy left Cuba 
and arrived at Vera Cruz on 8 December, to be followed by the British and finally the 
French in January 1862.
161
 
In early November Corwin received Seward’s 2 October letter refusing to grant 
 
the Mexicans a direct loan. By this time Corwin was convinced that one or all of the 
Treaty of London powers, or Allies, meant to use the affair as an excuse to invade 
Mexico. He was determined to prevent this from occurring and continued discussions 
with the Juárez administration. On 29 November, despite Seward’s previous 
instructions, Corwin sent the secretary another draft of a treaty for a direct loan to 
Mexico. The crisis in Mexico had now become a topic of great interest and discussion 
in the United States. When Seward presented Corwin’s latest treaty to the cabinet, it 
was decided that it should be passed on to Congress for discussion. Lincoln did this on 
17 December, offering Congress neither his preference nor opinion regarding the 
proposal. 
Romero held a similar view to Corwin regarding the proper role of the United 
States in relation to the crisis developing between Mexico and its European creditors. 
“The contest,” he proclaimed, was “between republican institutions and monarchy, 
between America and Europe.”162 Convinced that the European powers intended to 
invade and take possession of Mexico, Romero insisted that the United States was 
morally obliged to intervene. He was wary, however, of any agreement between his 
government and the United States which could involve the loss of Mexican land. Even a 
direct loan with no lien on Mexican territory could later result in the United States 
claiming it was owed compensation for its expenses. Romero searched for another 
means by which the United States could prevent a European attack on Mexico. 
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When the Allies signed the Treaty of London they had also invited the United 
States to join the agreement.
163 
On 4 December Romero met with Postmaster General 
Montgomery Blair, with whom he had regular contact, and suggested that the Lincoln 
administration take up the Europeans’ offer. By doing so, Romero explained to Blair, 
the United States could introduce discord between the Allies and sabotage the entire 
venture. Blair liked the idea and immediately relayed it to Seward, who in return 
expressed interest in the proposal and asked for it in writing. Blair and Romero were 
unaware, however, that Seward wrote to the Allies that same day declining their 
invitation to join their expedition.
164
 
When Seward entered the State Department he had a clear notion of the potential 
significance of the Civil War in regard to his long-term expansionist ambitions for his 
country. He also saw the Juárez government as well-suited to overseeing the 
development of Mexico into a stable republic and therefore determined to build 
cooperative relations with Mexico with a view to facilitating its future incorporation 
into the Union. Although he was committed to his long-term vision, Seward was 
nonetheless a pragmatist and understood the necessity of ensuring the Union was able to 
carry out its war effort free from the interference of the European powers. When 
Mexico became embroiled in a crisis involving Great Britain, France, and Spain, 
therefore, Seward was compelled to make adaptations to his original Mexican policy. 
He distanced his country from the Juárez government and refused to offer Mexico 
assistance in order to avoid retaliation from the European powers.  As will be discussed 
in the following chapter, however, as the European expedition to Mexico developed, 
Seward would find ways to continue to make progress in laying the groundwork for his 
goal of seeing Mexico absorbed into the United States. 
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 Chapter Two: “Neither the Right nor the Disposition to Intervene”: Seward and the  
 
European Expedition to Mexico, 1862-63 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert M. McLane was familiar with the nature of Mexican politics. In 1859 he had 
been appointed U.S. envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, 
marking the beginning of U.S. relations with the newly-established Juárez government. 
During the American Civil War, McLane temporarily retired from political life and in 
1862 he visited Europe. His political stature gained him access to the governing circles 
of Europe, and when he returned to the United States Romero questioned him about the 
attitude in France regarding Napoleon’s venture in Mexico. “The success or failure of 
the French forces in imposing monarchy on Mexico,” McLane informed Romero, “will 
depend exclusively on the means that are chosen to make it appear in Europe that the 
Mexican people really desire monarchy.”165 
The question of whether the Mexican people wanted a monarchy or a republic 
 
was an important aspect of the Treaty of London expedition and the subsequent French 
invasion of Mexico. It related to the broader issue surrounding these events of the 
current and future state of republican government in North America. The Allies argued 
that the United States had abandoned its self-proclaimed mission to lead the world 
towards republican government in favour of a career of aggressive imperialism. They 
also claimed that Mexico’s economic distress proved that republicanism had failed in 
that country and that its people yearned for a centralised form of government which 
could give them order and stability. Napoleon built on both of these themes to justify 
his invasion of Mexico. He argued that by overthrowing the Juárez government and 
replacing it with a monarchy, he was giving the Mexican people the security they 
desired, as well as strengthening the country against future U.S. attacks. The European 
expedition and French invasion of Mexico were based on and legitimised by the notion 
that republicanism had failed in North America. 
In the image which the Allies sought to present to the world, the United States 
and Mexico had succumbed to the common states of decay for republics. The United 
States had turned into an imperialist nation, motivated by a desire for power and land at 
the expense of other countries. Mexico, meanwhile, had devolved into a st ate of internal 
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chaos, factionalism, and disorder. Seward recognised the potential implications of this 
image for the United States and the future of republican government in the Western 
Hemisphere. Such an interpretation could be used by one or more of the European 
powers to justify intervention in the Civil War against the Union, and indeed was used 
by the French government to legitimise the attempted dismantling of the Mexican 
republic. If the image gained traction in Europe and around the world it could also lay 
the groundwork for the extension of European imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. 
Republicanism, the European powers could argue, had been tested and found inadequate, 
and therefore imperial monarchism was required to re-establish order in the New World. 
Seward was determined to counter this image and limit its harmful effects.  His 
approach to the European expedition and the French invasion of Mexico was designed 
to present the United States as a non-interventionist, benign republican power which 
neither needed nor wished to use force to further its interests. Simultaneously, Seward 
aimed to show the Allies that the Mexicans were both able and willing to defend their 
republic without the help of the United States. By doing so, Seward hoped to 
demonstrate to the Allies that republicanism had taken root in Mexico and could not be 
removed. He anticipated that this would allow him to inaugurate a new era in U.S. 
relations with the principal European powers based on respect for what he viewed as 
their respective spheres of influence, and cooperation in areas of common interest 
around the world. 
Seward’s wartime approach to relations with Great Britain, Spain, and France is 
a topic of interest and debate amongst historians. Particular attention is paid to the 
apparent transformation Seward’s style of diplomacy underwent during the early years 
of the Civil War. In his first year as secretary, Seward earned a reputation amongst the 
governments of Europe as a jingoist and Europhobe. In his April 1861 “Thoughts” 
memo he had suggested that the United States declare war on Spain, Great Britain, and 
Russia if it did not receive adequate explanations from each for their recent policies in 
the Western Hemisphere. Later that same year during the Trent affair, Lincoln was 
compelled to tone down the language of Seward’s dispatches to London in order to 
avoid triggering a war with Great Britain.
166 
When the Allies sent a portion of their 
 
military forces to Mexico in late 1861, however, Seward took no action. When the 
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French declared war on the Mexican republic in 1862, he issued a declaration of U.S. 
neutrality and refused to offer the Mexicans any assistance throughout the conflict. 
Seward’s seeming inconsistency has been accounted for by Immerman through 
the secretary’s evolving understanding of the severity of the Southern rebellion. 
Seward’s wish to see the Union preserved “drove him to try desperately to avoid a civil 
war.”167 He sought a foreign conflict to “shift the attention of both North and South 
toward an external enemy” and “unite the country in a burst of patriotic fervor.”168 As 
 
the Civil War developed it became clear to Seward that a foreign conflict would not be 
enough to bring the states back together. By 1862, Immerman argues, Seward “opposed 
proposals that the United States deploy its forces to Mexico” because he realised that 
the Confederates would likely welcome a European attack on the Union. 
169 
Other 
 
historians note that Lincoln played a role in bringing about Seward’s apparent 
transformation. According to Dean Mahin, Seward’s “Thoughts” memo was partly 
based on the secretary’s “lack of confidence” in Lincoln’s abilities as chief executive 
and his belief that he, Seward, was better suited to steer the United States through its 
crisis.
170 
Van Deusen also argues that Lincoln was obliged to bring Seward under 
 
control, and adds that over time an effective relationship developed between the two 
based on Seward’s “acceptance of Lincoln’s authority and responsibility in all 
spheres.”171 Both Van Deusen and Mahin conclude that when France invaded Mexico in 
1862, Seward sought Lincoln’s opinion and refrained from a rash response before 
deciding on a course of action. 
There are elements of truth in these arguments. Initially Seward, like many of 
 
his contemporaries, did underestimate the seriousness of the Southern rebellion. Indeed, 
he frequently made references to the fleeting and transitory nature of the rebels’ 
“passions.”172 Seward also doubted Lincoln’s abilities as commander-in-chief during 
the early months of the administration. Certain historians have noted, however, that the 
argument that these were the principal factors influencing Seward’s diplomacy in 1861 
overlooks the fact that the secretary’s pre-Civil War outlook was based on a “strong 
aversion to war and a disposition to discuss, conciliate, and negotiate, rather than to 
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bluster, boast, confront, and combat.”173 Sexton views Seward’s “Thoughts” memo as 
part of a diplomatic strategy which was designed to compel the European powers to 
exercise caution in their dealings with the United States.
174 
Seward allegedly sought to 
cultivate an image of himself as an aggressive, sabre-rattling, and unpredictable 
secretary who was liable to retaliate at any perceived slight by a foreign nation. Sexton 
adds that Seward was keenly aware of the necessity of avoiding war with any foreign 
nation while the Civil War continued. Therefore, he argues, while Seward had judged it 
possible to employ this somewhat risky diplomatic strategy in 1861, when the Allies’ 
military forces landed in Mexico in 1862 he erred on the side of caution and adopted a 
decidedly conciliatory approach in his dealings with the European powers. 
Sexton’s interpretation comes closest to accurately accounting for Seward’s 
 
seemingly contradictory actions with regard to relations with the European powers in 
 
1861 and 1862. His attempt to understand Seward’s diplomacy by looking to the 
secretary’s antebellum principles, however, is incomplete because it does not include an 
analysis of whether Seward’s neutrality towards the conflict between Mexico and 
France was also influenced by his pre-Civil War outlook. This chapter argues that 
Seward underwent no transformation over the course of the Civil War. He was a shrewd 
politician and keenly aware of the importance of perception and image in diplomacy. 
The impression which he created of himself as a potentially volatile element within the 
Lincoln administration was a useful strategy he briefly employed in 1861. His goal in 
cultivating this image, however, was to avert, not cause, war. Throughout his pre-Civil 
War career Seward had proven himself to be vehemently anti-war except in cases of 
self-defence. This extended to refusing to intervene in foreign conflicts, even to protect 
fellow republics. Indeed, as a senator in the 1850s Seward had insisted that non- 
intervention should be a guiding principle in the United States’ method for territorial 
expansion. His response to the French invasion of Mexico was, therefore, consistent 
with the method for national expansion which he had been advocating throughout his 
political career. 
By 8 January 1862 all three of the Allied powers had landed a portion of their 
military forces at Veracruz, Mexico. In February representatives of the Allies entered 
into negotiations with Mexican minister of foreign affairs Manuel Doblado. Talks 
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concluded on 19 February with the signing of the Soledad Convention. The Convention 
authorised the Allied troops to move from Veracruz, an area prone to outbreaks of 
yellow fever, to Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan. It also contained a formal refusal by 
the Juárez government of the Europeans’ offer to help put down elements of “intestine 
rebellion” supposedly present in Mexico.175 Finally, the Convention agreed that further 
 
talks concerning the issue of debt and other Allied grievances would commence at 
 
Orizaba on 15 April.
176
 
 
In his 6 April 1861 letter to Corwin, Seward had expressed his concern that a 
 
European power might seek to take possession of or extend its influence in Mexico.
177
 
 
By early 1862 he had reason to believe that France and Spain in particular were 
harbouring such designs. Queen Isabella II ruled Spain in conjunction with the Cortes, 
the national democratic parliament, which at the time was headed by General Leopoldo 
O’Donnell’s Liberal Union Party. Napoleon had been elected president of France in 
1848. In 1851 he had staged a coup d’état which proclaimed that he would remain “in 
office for ten years and assigned him massive executive powers to command the armed 
forces, declare war ... and to make new laws.”178 In both countries domestic politics 
were volatile. Liberals and republicans were oppressed, frustrated, and eager for 
governmental reform.
179 
In both Paris and Madrid the U.S. republic was viewed as a 
dangerous inspiration to those seeking structural change in the political system. 
Both governments, moreover, felt that their interests in the Western Hemisphere 
were threatened by the growing power and size of the United States. By the 1860s Spain 
retained control over only two colonies – Puerto Rico and Cuba – from its formerly 
large American empire. In recent decades Madrid’s policy in the Western Hemisphere 
had been geared towards maintaining its control over these possessions and extending 
its influence over new regions at opportune times. This had frequently brought Spain 
into conflict with the United States. In the 1850s proposals by U.S. politicians for the 
annexation of Cuba greatly angered Madrid. Conversely, Spain’s efforts throughout the 
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1840s and 50s to increase its influence in Santo Domingo offended Washington. By the 
time Seward became secretary, a “tradition of conflict” had been firmly established in 
U.S.-Spanish relations.
180
 
Napoleon followed an adventurist, expansionist foreign policy which he 
believed would help ease political tensions at home. He often pursued the 
“aggrandisement of France under cover of promoting a limited degree of nationalism” 
in the countries which he sought to possess.
181 
In 1858, for example, Napoleon 
negotiated a treaty with Italian minister Camillo Benso stipulating that France would 
help the Italians overthrow their Austrian rulers in return for Savoy and possibly Nice. 
Napoleon, moreover, was an opportunist, and as he witnessed the United States descend 
into civil war he began to develop plans for the reconstruction of a French American 
empire. In 1860 he appointed Dubois de Saligny, a firm supporter of French re- 
colonisation of the Western Hemisphere, minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
182
 
The third Allied nation, Great Britain, caused less concern to the Lincoln 
administration. Aside from Canada, Britain had been reducing its commitments in the 
Western Hemisphere in recent decades. In 1846 Britain had conceded Oregon Territory 
to the United States. In 1850 the United States and Britain signed the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty in which they agreed to joint control of the canal which was to be built across the 
Isthmus of Panama, and to refrain from further efforts to take possession of any part of 
Central America. These actions were the result of the opinion gaining ground in Londo n 
that possessions in the Western Hemisphere were burdensome and unprofitable. The 
Palmerston government was turning its attention to other areas, such as East Asia, 
which held new possibilities for commercial gain.
183
 
 
The European powers also had a history of interference in Mexico. The 
country’s economic fragility, political instability, abundant natural resources, and 
advantageous geo-political position made it an attractive site for European schemes of 
re-colonisation. In times of national crisis, Mexico had even applied to the governments 
 
of Europe for assistance. While negotiating the sale of the area south of the Gila River 
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to the United States in 1853, for instance, Mexican president Santa Anna had appealed 
to France and Britain to intervene militarily and save Mexico from the rapacity of the 
United States. Two factors prevented the intervention from occurring. Firstly, the 
United States could be expected to offer “active resistance” to European interference in 
the affair.
184 
Secondly, the outbreak of the Crimean War in late 1853 “absorbed the 
 
energies of England and France” and diverted their attention from Mexico.185 
 
In 1862 circumstances were more congenial for interference in Mexico. Europe 
was in a state of relative peace whereas the United States was in the throes of civil war. 
Furthermore, since the election of Juárez in 1861 growing numbers of Mexican 
Conservatives had been attempting to persuade the governments of Europe to help them 
overthrow the Juárez administration. Juan Nepomuceno Almonte was one such notable 
Conservative. Almonte was a prominent Mexican politician and had served in a range 
of posts, including secretary of war and minister to the United States, under various 
governments. In 1856 Mexican president Ignacio Comonfort appointed Almonte 
minister to Britain, France, and Spain. When the War of Reform began, Almonte used 
his position to garner European ruling class support for the Conservatives, negotiate 
foreign loans to aid the Conservative war effort, and devise schemes for European 
intervention in the war. Almonte and many other Conservatives hoped that European 
intervention would lead to the overthrow of the Juárez government, the banishment of 
the Liberals, and the establishment of a centralised government in Mexico. While they 
conceded that such a government might necessarily be headed by a European monarch, 
they anticipated that it would otherwise be staffed with Conservatives. 
Corwin’s analysis of the Allies’ monetary claims on Mexico confirmed 
Seward’s suspicion that France and Spain were intending to use Juárez’s suspension of 
payments as a pretext for interference in Mexico. Britain, Corwin believed, posed the 
least threat to Mexico. “The money demands of England,” he wrote to Seward in early 
1862, “are in the main, if not altogether, just.”
186 
Corwin described Spain’s monetary 
 
demands as “an outrageous fraud” because they were based on a loan negotiated with 
Almonte to aid anti-Juarist forces during the War of Reform.
187 
The legitimate claims of 
the French, Corwin continued, were small, and as such the large amounts Paris 
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demanded from Juárez were “so enormously unjust as to be totally inadmissible as to 
the amounts claimed.”188 
Seward was not alone in his concerns. Romero in Washington D.C. and Corwin 
in Mexico City were both convinced that a European attack on Mexico was imminent. 
By January 1862 the November 1861 draft of Corwin’s treaty was being considered by 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Romero used his contact with the 
Committee’s chairman, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, to track its progress. 
Sumner, a radical anti-slavery Republican, was sympathetic to the Mexican republic. He 
also disliked Seward and was eager to “undermine respect for the secretary of state at 
home and abroad.”189 Sumner’s enmity towards Seward was rooted in their pre-war 
ideological differences, particularly over the issue of slavery. During the 1850s, 
furthermore, Sumner and Seward had been rivals “for leadership within the Republican 
Party” and Sumner was convinced that, due to his own foreign policy credentials, he 
would be the next choice for secretary of state if Seward were to lose his post.
190
 
Perceiving that Romero sought to advance a Mexican policy which countered Seward’s, 
 
Sumner was willing to offer the chargé his assistance. 
 
Sumner informed Romero that the Committee was hesitant to approve Corwin’s 
treaty. At the time, the Trent Affair had not yet been resolved and tensions were running 
high between the United States and Great Britain.
191 
Senators were wary of angering the 
British further and were also hesitant to do anything which might incur the disapproval 
of France and Spain. Romero suggested to Sumner that the Senate delay its 
consideration of the loan. He hoped that once the Trent Affair had blown over, Northern 
politicians would be more willing to offer aid to the Mexicans. On 28 January Romero 
made an additional suggestion. He had long been sceptical that a financial loan to 
Mexico would be enough to prevent an Allied invasion. He therefore put the idea to 
Sumner that if the Corwin treaty were approved by Congress, the United States should 
also “offer to mediate the present difficulties between the European powers and Mexico” 
 
to bring about a peaceful end to the expedition.
192 
Sumner liked the proposal and 
together they drafted  a resolution which contained “(1) an offer of mediation; (2) 
payment by the United States of the immediate claims of the allies against Mexico, 
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which also will be done immediately; (3) payment for five years of the interest on 
Mexico’s foreign debt; (4) payment of the foreign conventions, consolidating them into 
a fund that will be paid off within a period of five or ten years; (5) no arrangement 
except in concert with and to the satisfaction of the allies.”193 
Seward was aware that Senate approval of Corwin’s treaty would contradict the 
 
position he wished to maintain towards the Allied expedition. In early February the 
secretary got wind of Sumner and Romero’s plan to suggest the United States mediate 
the affair. When the proposal was discussed in a cabinet meeting, Seward suggested that 
his old friend General Winfield Scott be appointed to head any mediation commission 
sent to Mexico.
194 
Seward’s suggestion leaked and was soon being widely discussed by 
Union politicians. The notion of appointing “an aging and infirm general” with the 
delicate task of mediation and negotiation was absurd enough.
195 
That this general had 
overseen the U.S. capture of Mexico City in 1847, moreover, would offend Mexico and 
raise serious doubts in the minds of the Allies as to whether the United States intended 
to interfere in Mexico itself.
196
 
 
Romero and Sumner’s resolution was submitted to the Senate on 18 February 
and Seward’s scheme soon had its desired effect. The association of Scott with the 
Corwin treaty raised “enough questions” to cause the Senate to reject the idea of 
offering assistance to Mexico altogether.
197 
On 25 February the Senate voted 28 to 8 for 
 
a substitute resolution introduced by Senator John Sherman of Ohio which stated that “it 
is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any 
portion of the principal or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the 
concurrence of the European powers.”198 Three days later Seward sent Corwin a copy of 
Sherman’s resolution along with instructions to act accordingly in his relations with the 
Juárez government.  What Seward would not discover until many weeks later was that 
his directions to Corwin had not reached their destination soon enough. The minister 
had already signed a treaty with the Juárez government, soon to be sent back to the 
United States for ratification, which provided for a direct loan to Mexico. 
Believing that he had successfully eliminated congressional support for a loan to 
 
Mexico, Seward turned his attention to reports from his ministers in Europe that France 
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and Spain were progressing in their plans to interfere in Mexico. Horatio Perry, former 
U.S. secretary of legation in Spain, had replaced Carl Schurz as minister to Spain in 
December 1861 after the latter requested a role as general in the Union Army. In March 
Perry reported that Paris and Madrid were discussing potential mo narchs to replace 
Juárez. “We have heard the name of the Count of Flanders (younger brother of Brabant) 
mentioned frequently of late in connexion with the projected throne in Mexico,” Perry 
wrote.
199 
The count, it was rumoured, was expected to marry the eldest daughter of 
 
Montpensier, a Spanish infante.
200 
Meanwhile, Perry continued, “the candidacy of the 
Archduke Maximilian of Austria for the projected throne in Mexico” had been put 
forward by the French.
201 
The Austrians resented Napoleon for having sent French 
armies into northern Italy in 1859 and driving them out of Lombardy. 
202 
Napoleon was 
anxious to put an Austrian noble on the throne of Mexico as a means of having the 
Austrians back on side “in the delicate but deadly game of diplomacy and war among 
the Continental powers.”203 
Perry’s communications to Seward also revealed that tensions were emerging 
between the Allies. Madrid, he explained, had expected “to take the direction of the land 
operations in Mexico.”204 Spanish troops were the first to arrive in Mexico in 1861, 
having been called in from Cuba. Madrid had also expected that any monarch 
established in Mexico would be Spanish. Mexico was, after all, a formerly colony of 
theirs. Napoleon’s decision in early 1862 to send additional troops to Mexico had 
therefore “produced surprise and chagrin” in Madrid.205 French preparations to bring in 
the Austrian archduke Ferdinand Maximilian for the Mexican throne constituted 
“another blow upon Spanish hopes.”206 Tension was also growing between Spanish and 
French military officials in Mexico as they vied for control over the expedition. As a 
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result the Spanish, Perry reported, were moving towards a “close and int imate” 
 
understanding with the British.
207
 
 
On 8 April, before negotiations had begun at Orizaba, the Allies disagreed over 
“the proper construction of a clause in the treaty of London, and agreed that each party 
should act without reference to that treaty.”208 Britain and Spain announced their 
withdrawal from Mexico, and by 24 April only French forces remained. Perry perceived 
Spanish resentment of Napoleon’s assumption of control over the expedition, as well as 
his insistence that Maximilian take the Mexican throne, as the principal reasons behind 
Madrid’s decision to abandon the expedition. British and Spanish representatives 
remained to negotiate further with the Juárez government. Napoleon, meanwhile, 
claimed that he could not trust Juárez to honour any agreement made between their two 
countries. Instead, French officials made contact with anti-Juárez Conservative elements 
in Mexico.
209
 
Dispatches to Seward sent by his ministers abroad gave information regarding 
both Allied plans to install a European monarch in Mexico, and how they justified the 
scheme. Paris and Madrid, Seward learned, were constructing an image of the United 
States devised to undermine its credibility as a “beacon of liberty.” French and Spanish 
politicians, particularly conservatives, insisted that recent acts of aggressive acquisition 
by the United States necessitated outside intervention in Mexico. During the past three 
decades the United States had absorbed Texas, acquired Oregon Territory from Britain, 
forcibly taken roughly half of Mexico, and attempted to annex Cuba. In March 1862 
Spanish foreign minister Fernando Calderon Collantes informed Perry that the 
overwhelming opinion in Europe was that the United States was “overbearing and 
aggressive, displaying little courtesy towards other nations, and little consideration for 
their rights.”210 The expedition had been necessary to prevent “the establishment of a 
protectorate by the United States over Mexico.”211 The Allies were able to cast their 
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venture in an altruistic light, claiming their motivation was to save Mexico from the 
 
United States’ territorial ambitions. 
 
William L. Dayton’s report of a debate which took place in the French 
parliamentary body, the Corps Legislatif, revealed another way in which European 
conservatives used recent U.S. expansionism to justify their expedition. Adolphe 
Billault, a conservative legislator whom Dayton described as the mouth-piece of the 
emperor, argued that the United States had set a precedent for intervention in Mexico. In 
 
1846, Billault noted, the United States had also had grievances against the Mexican 
government.
212 
The United States had invaded Mexico, addressed its complaints, and 
claimed compensation from the Mexican government, after which “the American army 
was able to leave.”213 Since that time “governmental organization” in Mexico had 
“disappeared” and the country was now even more incapable of honouring its 
international obligations and agreements.
214 
Billault insisted that France had just as 
much right to land its armies in Mexico as the United States had in 1846. 
This image of the United States as an aggressive nation was also applied to the 
Civil War. In May 1861 Dayton sent Seward an extract from a conservative French 
newspaper, Le Constitutionnel, which read, “The north is fighting for supremacy; the 
south is fighting for independence.”215 Perry explained that the governing classes of 
Europe were “deeply imbued with the ... notion of an aristocratical and chivalrous 
society in the south of the United States, armed to resist the aggressions of an underbred 
sans culotte democracy at the north.”216 “They were still full of the resentments,” he 
continued, “produced by our filibustering exploits of former years, which were for them 
connected only with the name of the United States. The Confederate States was a new 
name, as yet unsullied,” and therefore “could not but be the friends of Spain.”217 Perry 
added that the Lincoln administration’s refusal to state emancipation as a Union war 
aim gave weight to this interpretation of the Civil War, as it denied him the ability to 
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argue that the Confederacy was fighting for slavery, rather than democracy and 
freedom.
218
 
French and Spanish policy-makers also argued that republicanism had failed in 
Mexico. A belief had long been harboured amongst the governing classes of Europe that 
the Mexicans were incapable of self-government. As Nancy Barker notes, the 
Europeans had accounted for the difficulties which Mexico had experienced since 
gaining independence by pointing to the Mexicans’ “ineptitude and weakness” and the 
“deplorable absence of any sense of national identity or patriotism” within their 
country.
219 
Paris and Madrid also argued that, as with the Union’s use of force against 
the Confederacy, Juárez had betrayed his republican principles by employing tactics of 
repression against his own citizens. On 18 December 1861 the Juárez administration 
had passed a law providing for the imprisonment of “disloyal” citizens in order to 
prevent Mexican Conservative leaders from conspiring with French officials. Billault 
seized upon the law as an example of the “reckless tyranny” of the Juárez administration 
and characterised the legislation as a “violent” measure designed to stifle “within the 
country any opinions hostile” to Juárez’s interests.220 Billault went on to explain that the 
 
Allies were “importing into Mexico” much needed “ideas of civilization and public 
rights.”221 The Mexican republic was in a state of anarchy, and the Europeans saw 
“monarchy as a cure” to this problem.222 
Using the diplomatic means at his disposal, Seward aimed to counter the 
European conservatives’ interpretation of the state of republicanism in North America. 
Firstly, he constructed an alternat ive narrative of recent U.S. history in order to place 
the blame of previous acts of expansion on the shoulders of the Southern slaveholders. 
Under Seward’s instructions, Perry explained to Collantes that in recent decades U.S. 
foreign policy had been “overshadowed, overlaid by the will” of the “overbearing and 
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aggressive” Southerners.223 They had pushed for national expansion in order to provide 
 
for the “perpetuation of African slavery in North America.”224 
 
Seward then insisted that it was this same minority of power-hungry 
slaveholders who had manipulated the Southern states into seceding. “This is a struggle 
of factious leaders in the south,” Seward wrote to Dayton in June 1862, “to build up a 
political empire on the foundation of human slavery.”225 The Civil War, Seward argued, 
was not rooted in Southern dissatisfaction with supposed Northern domination of the 
federal government. Nor did it signal the deterioration of republican government in the 
United States. Rather, it was the result of the “popular passions” of a faction of 
slaveholders who, “in an unhappy moment” distracted and consumed by greed, had 
sought to expand their immoral institution.
226 
These passions, Seward continued, were 
“subsiding” and soon the Civil War “will be remembered only as a calamity to be 
deplored, and a crime never again to be repeated.”227 
Having established that the Union did not harbour schemes of territorial 
conquest, Seward was able to impress upon the Allies that a new era in U.S. foreign 
policy had begun. “The American people,” Perry told Collantes on Seward’s 
instructions, “desired peace and the peaceful development of their industry and 
commerce without attacking the rights or prejudicing the interests of any other 
people.”228 Henceforth, Seward insisted, the United States would focus on developing 
 
cooperative commercial relations with the nations of the Western Hemisphere. He 
reasoned that the European powers should no longer see the United States as a threat to 
their interests in the region or elsewhere in the world. Instead, the United States and the 
powers of Europe should forge relations based on mutual respect and commercial 
cooperation, together coordinating the development of areas of shared economic interest 
around the world. 
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Following the split between the Allies in April 1862, the French embarked on an 
independent venture in Mexico and their plans to overthrow the Juárez government 
were revealed to the international community. The first major conflict, the Battle of 
Puebla, took place on 5 May and resulted in a victory for the Juarist forces under 
General Ignacio Zaragoza. The tide of the war quickly turned, however, and with the 
addition of several thousand troops the French were able to make gains throughout the 
rest of 1862, taking Orizaba in June and Tampico in October. The summer of 1862 also 
saw the Confederacy “counterpunch” against recent Union gains in the Civil War.229 
 
From 25 June to 1 July Confederate general Lee drove Union general George B. 
McClellan’s forces back from Richmond in the Seven Days Battle. In August 
Confederate general Braxton Bragg was able to recapture part of Tennessee and invade 
Kentucky while Lee led his troops to victory at Second Manassas before moving 
northward towards Maryland. 
Reports started to feed back to the State Department that Madrid was beginning 
to reconsider its decision to pull out of Mexico. As Perry noted to Seward in August 
1862, “The vacillation of the O’Donnell government has been great” over the Mexican 
question.
230 
Although there had been disagreements between the French and Spanish 
over the conduct of the venture, Perry informed Seward, Madrid was beginning “to 
entertain some apprehensions” about its withdrawal from Mexico.231 The O’Donnell 
government believed that, in the light of recent French and Confederate victories, it 
might be in its interests to re-enter Mexico in order to ensure the extension of Spanish 
influence in Latin America.
232
 
One of the contributing factors to this change of opinion in Spain were rumours 
that the Lincoln administration had agreed to give a loan to the Juárez government in 
return for liens on Mexican land. The treaty for a direct loan which Corwin had 
negotiated with the Mexican government in February had been sent back to the United 
States and in May Lincoln had submitted it to Congress. Collantes warned Perry that the 
ratification of the treaty could provide the basis for a new diplomatic arrangement 
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between the European powers in regard to Mexico.
233   
Seward responded quickly, using 
the loan as an opportunity to prove the validity of his claim that the United States had 
abandoned its territorial expansionist agenda. He ordered Perry to inform Collantes that 
Corwin had negotiated the loan “in the absence of any instructions, and that it may 
perhaps be thought by the Senate to conflict with the policy that it has heretofore 
indicated.”234 In subsequent letters, Seward impressed upon Perry the importance of 
convincing Madrid that the United States “needs no more territory, and it will 
scrupulously respect the rights of other nations.”235 On 3 July the Senate decided not to 
approve the loan and, not wishing to offend the Juárez government, left the treaty 
permanently pending on the table.
236
 
News of the Senate’s effective rejection of the Corwin loan had not reached 
Madrid soon enough. On 1 August Perry informed Seward that Spanish General Jose de 
la Concha, former general captain of Cuba, had been appointed ambassador to Paris.
237
 
De la Concha was an ardent advocate of increasing Spanish possessions in the Western 
Hemisphere. Accordingly, the appointment was seen in Washington as a sign of the 
possible renewal of the Franco-Spanish alliance in Mexico. Dayton confirmed these 
fears, informing Seward that in Paris the move was viewed as an indication that the 
Spanish were “willing again to co-operate with France in Mexico.”238 
Seward now sought to prevent a renewal of this alliance. Having established that 
 
the United States no longer had an expansionist agenda, Seward began to insist that the 
 
United States was Spain’s best ally with regards to affairs in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
“The visible policy of the Emperor,” Perry informed Collantes, “was to increase the 
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maritime power of France.”239 “The geographical and strategical position of the Spanish 
colonies in the West Indies,” he continued, “with their magnificent harbors on the road 
between France and Mexico, ought to make the government of her Catholic Majesty 
careful as to the consequences of the present French intervention in the interior affairs 
of that country.”240 Perry went on to impress upon the Spanish that the leaders of the 
 
Confederacy “were holding up to the population of the South the plan of immediately 
 
annexing Cuba, San Domingo, and Mexico.”241 
 
Perry was then able to argue that Spain and the United States had a “similarity of 
interest” in regard to both Mexico and the Western Hemisphere.242 The minister even 
suggested that the two countries would benefit from taking “a common line of action in 
America” against the expansionist ambitions of France and the South.243 By September 
Seward had reason to believe his efforts had been successful. Perry informed him that 
“Calderon was persuaded that my representations of a change in the tendencies of the 
government of the United States, since our southern statesmen had ceased to be 
dominant at Washington, were just.”244 Seward’s careful diplomacy had helped to 
 
ensure that Madrid did not enter into a new alliance with Napoleon. The secretary had, 
moreover, made significant progress in altering Spanish perceptions of the United States 
and laying the groundwork for new, more cooperative relations between the two 
countries in the future. 
With the threat of Spanish re-entry into Mexico receding, Seward focussed on 
relations with France. When war broke out between France and the Juarists, French 
foreign minister Edouard Thouvenel explained to Dayton that his government did not 
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intend to “interfere with the form of government” in Mexico.245 Nor did it wish to 
“acquire an inch of territory, nor remain indefinitely in the country.”246 Napoleon’s only 
objectives were to see that France’s grievances were settled and that some form of 
government was established in Mexico “which other countries could treat with.”247 
Napoleon himself insisted that “it is contrary to my interest, my origin, and my 
principles to impose any kind of government whatever on the Mexican people; they 
may freely choose that which suits them best.”248 The emperor openly admitted, 
therefore, that his goal was to overthrow the Juárez administration. He insisted, however, 
that the Mexican people would choose what government would replace it. 
Officially, Seward took Napoleon at his word. “France has a right to make war 
against Mexico,” he directed Dayton to relay to Thouvenel, “and to determine for 
herself the cause.”249 He insisted that as the French invasion of Mexico was not for the 
purposes of imperial conquest and had a legitimate basis in French monetary grievances 
against the Juárez administration, the United States had no right to object or intervene. 
Seward qualified his comments, however, by stating that “we do not desire to suppress 
the fact that our sympathies are with Mexico” and that the United States “do not 
disapprove” of the Juárez administration.250 Nevertheless, Seward vowed that his 
country would remain neutral towards the conflict. 
The Confederates, however, were willing to take sides. By late 1862 they had 
“realized that any chance of British diplomatic recognition had evaporated.”251 This was 
largely due to the work of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. On 22 
September, after Union forces had successfully repelled the Confederates from 
Maryland at the battle of Antietam, Lincoln issued a declaration to the Southern states 
warning them that unless they re-joined the Union by 1 January 1863, their slaves 
would be freed.
252 
Seward immediately used the proclamation to his diplomatic 
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advantage. “Are the enlightened and humane nations Great Britain and France,” he 
asked Dayton, “to enter, directly or indirectly, into this conflict” which has “become a 
war between freedom and human bondage?”253 
The Confederates anticipated that this argument would resonate with the British 
and in turn decided to redouble their diplomatic efforts on France. In September 
Confederate envoy John Mason was withdrawn from London and British consuls were 
expelled from the South.
254 
Mason was moved to Paris, where Napoleon’s government 
still had incentives for recognising the Confederacy. Britain was able to compensate 
partially for the loss of Southern cotton by turning to Egypt. France, however, had no 
such alternative source. As a result France’s textile industry was grinding to a halt and 
domestic unrest in the country was growing.
255 
By striking up an alliance with the 
Confederacy, Napoleon might be able to gain access to Southern cotton through trade 
across Mexico’s northern border. By helping the South claim its independence, 
moreover, Napoleon could establish a bulwark between Mexico and the Union and 
thereby reduce the threat of Northern interference in his war against the Juarists. Seward 
understood that if he showed any partiality towards the Juarists, Napoleon would 
immediately ally himself with the South. 
Most Union politicians believed that the United States ought to distance itself 
from the conflict in Mexico. By early 1863 even Sumner was entreating his fellow 
senators “not to present anything or say anything” in Congress regarding Mexico “that 
would be offensive to France.”256 Sumner’s resentment towards Seward had not 
lessened. Indeed, he had recently been part of an effort to remove the secretary from the 
cabinet. Seward was known to be influential with Lincoln and to “oppose the extreme 
views of the Radical Republicans.”257 In December 1862 a group of Radical Republican 
senators including Sumner met with Lincoln and asked for Seward’s removal from the 
administration. In response, Seward submitted his resignation, as did Secretary of the 
Treasury Salmon P. Chase, who supported the Radicals. Lincoln adroitly solved the 
cabinet crisis by refusing both resignations, thereby “demonstrating that both radical 
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and conservative viewpoints would continue to be heard” in his administration.258 The 
incident also revealed the “effective relationship” which had developed bet ween 
Lincoln and his secretary since the early months of the administration.
259
 
Sumner’s changing opinion regarding Mexico was reflective of the mood across 
the Union that neutrality towards the French invasion was a necessary evil. The war 
against the South was turning into a long slog and Northern politicians, including 
Sumner, placed greater importance on ensuring the Union was able to fight unmolested 
by foreign interference than they did on undermining Seward or saving the Mexican 
republic. This left Romero in a difficult position, and his efforts to generate support 
amongst Union politicians for U.S. assistance to the Mexican republic yielded few 
results. In early 1863, however, he made contact with one politician who was deeply 
concerned about the conflict in Mexico. Senator James McDougall of California had 
during his time in the Californian state senate in the 1850s been a strong advocate of 
western development and the building of the transcontinental railroad.
260 
He was a 
 
Democrat who had no sympathy for the anti-slavery cause. During the secession crisis, 
however, he had declared the Union inviolate and journeyed to Washington to replace 
then-California senator and secessionist William Gwin.
261
 
McDougall had written a resolution to submit to the Senate, and on 18 January 
 
1863 he met with Romero to discuss its contents. The resolution accused Napoleon of 
violating “the established and known rules of international law” by attempting to 
“subject the republic of Mexico to her authority by armed force.”262 McDougall rejected 
the argument that the French had a legitimate reason for taking military action against 
the Juárez government and insisted that the invasion was driven purely by Napoleon’s 
imperial ambitions. The resolution went on to proclaim that the United States should 
“lend such aid to the republic of Mexico as is or may be required, to prevent the forcible 
interposition of any of the states of Europe in the political affairs of that republic.” 263 
Knowing the mood amongst Northern congressmen regarding Mexico, Romero 
 
intimated through dispatches to his government that he had not “the remotest hope that 
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McDougall’s resolutions will be approved by the Senate.”264 Nonetheless, he hoped that 
“the mere fact of their presentation and the subsequent discussion ... will produce results 
favourable” to the Mexican republic.265 The chargé gave the resolution his full approval 
and on 19 January McDougall submitted it to the Senate. 
On 3 February McDougall gave a speech to the Senate in support of his 
resolution. He began by stating that, once the conquest of Mexico was accomplished, 
Napoleon “will then directly seek the possession and control of the territories south and 
west of the Mississippi river.”266 “It will not be long,” McDougall warned, “before the 
front of an undisguised enemy will be exhibited to this Republic, and simultaneous with 
that will be the attempt to seize upon all there is of our Republic on the shores of the 
Pacific.”267 The invasion of Mexico, McDougall declared, was the first stage in 
Napoleon’s plan to re-establish a French American empire which would encompass 
large parts of the United States. The acquisition of California, which offered access to 
Pacific commercial trading routes and the Far East, was undoubtedly one of Napoleon’s 
chief objectives. 
The Union, McDougall continued, was particularly vulnerable to the “false and 
fraudulent pretexts” which Napoleon typically employed when commencing an 
invasion.
268 
In Mexico, the emperor had encouraged elements of internal dissatisfaction 
within the nation and then pointed to this domestic discontent as proof that the Juárez 
government was incapable of controlling the country. McDougall alleged that the 
French had been employing this same strategy in California for over a decade. In 1850 
France had sent a portion of the Garde Mobile to San Francisco under the “protection 
and patronage” of the French consul, thereby establishing a “military nucleus” in the 
United States.
269 
Napoleon had then attempted to use his “military and physical power 
in California” to cultivate and exacerbate unrest within the state.270 The disturbances 
which had occurred in San Francisco in 1856, McDougall argued, had been the work of 
French soldiers who “took up arms against the authorities” in an attempt to establish a 
 
“reign of terror” in the city.271 “Their watchword,” he insisted, “was revolution,” and 
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their purpose had been to destabilise and weaken California to make it ripe for French 
conquest.
272
 
McDougall argued that California in 1863 was even more unstable than it had 
been in 1856, and therefore more vulnerable to a French invasion. “The southern part of 
our state of California,” he warned, “is none too loyal.”273 Federal military presence in 
the state, moreover, was “scarcely sufficient for the purposes of our Indian frontier,” let 
alone warding off foreign invasion.
274 
The strength of pro-Southern sentiment in 
California was compounded, McDougall continued, “by some law, which I will not 
undertake to expound, our people hardly ever understand anything that is further West 
than they have been.”275 Californians felt a lack of affinity with the rest of the nation. 
McDougall’s concern was not only the secession of the Southern states, but future 
secessions and separations within the Union. “When anarchy shall have fully taken the 
place of the order that once pervaded throughout our States,” he warned, the French 
would be able to easily invade.
276
 
U.S. military intervention in Mexico would pre-emptively strike at the French 
 
and improve the internal harmony and cohesiveness of the Union. “An expedition south,” 
 
McDougall insisted, “would unite firmly the people of all the loyal states, and renew 
that war spirit that seems to have faded before military management and congressional 
legislation.”277 Intervening in Mexico, moreover, could end the Civil War. As 
McDougall asked, “How would the truly democratic masses of the South care to band 
with the Emperor of the French against the United States? I am of the opinion that it 
would greatly impair, not aid, the home strength of the rebellion.”278 “This assault on 
free institutions by the French Emperor,” he continued, “will detach from the rebellion 
many true republicans, who from this, taking warning, will seek the old standard and 
with us once more join hand in hand in the maintenance of the cause of free 
institutions.”279 Northerners and Southerners, McDougall believed, needed to be 
reminded of their common republican loyalties and reclaim their shared national 
identity as leader and defender of self-governance, liberty, and democracy in the New 
World. 
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McDougall’s resolutions failed to pass the Senate. Romero was not surprised, 
surmising that, as he had expected, senators were reluctant to do “anything that would 
be offensive to France.”280 McDougall continued to submit resolutions to the Senate 
advocating U.S. military, material, or monetary aid to Mexico. He failed to gain much 
support for his cause. This was in part because McDougall’s resolutions were extreme. 
In January 1864, for example, he proposed that the United States declare war on France 
if Napoleon did not agree to withdraw his troops from Mexico immediately.
281
 
McDougall’s reputation in Washington, furthermore, was declining throughout 1863 
and 1864. He had made many enemies amongst Radical Republicans in Congress, 
particularly Sumner, and was often accused of being a Southern sympathiser.
282
 
McDougall was also an alcoholic, and by 1864 his habit of appearing in the Senate 
inebriated resulted in his political reputation being widely discredited.
283
 
Seward, meanwhile, believed his own policy of studied neutrality was the best 
means of preventing a French attack on the United States. By the summer of 1863 the 
Confederacy was making progress in its effort to gain French recognition. On 26 June 
Dayton reported to Seward that Napoleon had met with Confederate envoy John Slidell 
to discuss the idea of France and Britain offering to mediate the Civil War.
284 
The 
Confederates knew that the Lincoln administration would reject the offer. This would 
then pave the way for France to intervene in the war on the side of the Confederacy by 
claiming that the North was not interested in peace and only sought domination over the 
South. “We have interfered with the dominion or the ambitious designs of no nation,” 
Seward replied to the French government, “we have seen San Domingo absorbed by 
Spain, and been content with a protest. We have seen Great Britain strengthen her 
government in Canada, and have approved it. We have seen France make war against 
Mexico, and have not allied ourselves with that republic.”285 “Under these 
 
circumstances,” he concluded, “if intervention in any form shall come, it will find us in 
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the right of the controversy and in the strong attitude of self-defense.”286 By not 
interfering in the conflict in Mexico, Seward was able to insist that Napoleon’s 
government remain neutral to the war in the United States. 
Seward was also convinced that the Mexicans did not require U.S. assistance. 
Napoleon had based his invasion on the erroneous assumption that the Mexicans would 
welcome the overthrow of their republic. Seward assured Dayton in April that as 
“difficult as the exercise of self-government” had been for the Mexicans, “it is, 
nevertheless, quite certain that the attempt to maintain foreign authority there would 
encounter insurmountable embarrassment.”287 Previous decades of internal factionalism 
 
and disorder in Mexico were not, Seward insisted, the result of the inability or 
unwillingness of the Mexicans to establish a republic. They were part of the natural 
process most nations experienced when transitioning from a colony to a self-governing 
democracy. Indeed, during recent decades the Mexicans had been “steadily advancing” 
in this process and were now on the cusp of cementing the “permanent institutions” of 
their republic.
288 
They could not now be deterred from accomplishing their goal, and 
 
Napoleon could expect to encounter “most annoying and injurious hindrance and 
resistance” to his effort to force a monarchy on Mexico.289 
Seward anticipated that other factors would also hinder Napoleon’s venture. 
French liberals, such as politician Jules Favre, strongly opposed the invasion. In 1862 
Favre had vehemently condemned the emperor’s attempt to “overthrow the established 
government” of Mexico and “erect a monarchy in its place.”290 He opposed the 
“adventurous” expedition because it embroiled France in “a distant and expensive war” 
at a time when “strict economy” was a “bounden duty.”291 Favre also questioned the 
wisdom of expanding France’s possessions overseas, warning that “after victory will 
come responsibility. The stable government that would be established would cause an 
expense of thirty millions to be inscribed in the Budget.”292 
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Seward hoped that liberal dissent in France would pressure Napoleon to 
terminate the expedition, and that his own policy of neutrality would strengthen the 
French liberals’ arguments. “I cannot doubt,” Seward wrote to Dayton in June 1863, 
“that the republicanism of France has derived some strength from violence done, by real 
or seeming imperial organs, to the cause of republicanism in America.”293 By refraining 
 
from intervening in Mexico, Seward aimed to undermine French conservative 
 
arguments that the United States was an aggressive and dangerous neighbour to Mexico. 
In doing so, he hoped to assist the French liberals as they sought to counter the 
arguments put forward by Napoleon to justify the invasion and ultimately bring about 
an end to the venture. 
 
Despite growing domestic opposition to the venture, Napoleon’s invasion of 
Mexico was progressing. In July Seward received news that French authorities had 
established a provisional government in Mexico. Almonte and other prominent Mexican 
Conservatives been chosen to form a superior junta of “distinguished notables” to 
represent the Mexican people.
294 
The junta convened and declared that the Mexicans 
 
desired a limited hereditary monarchy as their form of government with a Catholic 
monarch on the throne. The position of emperor of the “Mexican Empire” was then 
offered to Archduke Maximilian.
295
 
These events contradicted Napoleon’s continual reassurances to the United 
States that he would never institute a government in Mexico without the peoples’ 
consent. When Dayton made enquiries to the French government in October, he was 
informed that a “vote of the entire country, and of all its departments, whether the 
French were or were not in their possession, would be taken, and if upon its registries it 
should appear that a large majority of the whole population ... were favorable to a 
monarchical form of government ... that would be sufficient.”296 Napoleon’s 
 
government also noted to Dayton that the principal danger now facing the “Mexican 
 
Empire” came from the United States. The sooner the Lincoln administration showed 
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itself  “satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into peaceful relations with the 
government, the sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new 
government to take care of itself.”297 
Seward replied that his country would recognise no change of government in 
Mexico while the Juárez administration still stood. “The United States,” he insisted, 
“continue to regard Mexico as the theatre of a war which has not yet ended in the 
subversion of the government long existing there, with which the United States remain 
in the relation of peace and sincere friendship; and that, for this reason, the United 
States are not now at liberty to consider the question of recognizing a government 
which, in the further chances of war, may come into its place.”298 He would not, 
moreover, support any government that had not been shown to have the support of the 
Mexican people. Nor would the United States anticipate their choice by trying to 
“interfere with their proceedings, or control or interfere with their free choice.” 299   “The 
 
United States,” Seward concluded, “consistently with their principles, can do no 
otherwise than leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own people, and 
recognize their sovereignty and independence in whatever form they themselves shall 
choose.”300 While Napoleon still promised to leave the future of Mexico to be decided 
by the will of the people, Seward maintained that it would be in conflict with his 
country’s principles to intervene. 
Privately, Seward expressed to Dayton his confidence regarding the will of the 
Mexican people. “The inherent and normal opinion of Mexico,” he wrote, “favors a 
government there in republican form and domestic in its organization, in preference to 
any monarchical institutions to be imposed from abroad.”301 Napoleon was attempting 
to push against the natural “progress of civilization on the American continent.”302 The 
emperor did not yet fully realise that any “foreign resistance, or attempts to control 
American civilization, must and will fail before the ceaseless and ever-increasing 
activity of material, moral, and political forces, which peculiarly belong to the 
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American continent.”303 Seward was convinced that, either through popular vote or 
continuous fighting, the Mexican people would demonstrate to Napoleon and the world 
their commitment to republican government. 
Seward hoped that studied neutrality towards the conflict between Mexico and 
France would protect the Union from French interference in the Civil War. It would also 
undermine some of the arguments made by Napoleon to justify his invasion of Mexico, 
and thereby possibly bring about a quicker end to the venture.  Non-interventionism had 
long been a guiding principle in Seward’s outlook regarding foreign relations. By 
distancing his country from the war developing in Mexico, Seward aimed to 
demonstrate to the world that the U.S. government, freed from the influence of Southern 
slaveholders, had turned a corner in its approach to foreign policy. Henceforth the U.S. 
republic would pursue relations with all countries based on peaceful commercial 
cooperation and collaboration.  In contradiction to the European conservatives’ 
arguments, Seward aimed to show that the United States had not abandoned its 
republican principles and mutated into an aggressive imperialistic nation. The secretary, 
furthermore, anticipated that soon Napoleon and the European powers would be offered 
resounding proof that the Mexicans had also not given up on republicanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
303 Ibid. 
69  
 
 
 Chapter Three: “Abide the Trial of Experiment”: Domestic Opposition to Seward’s  
 
Mexican Policy, 1864-65 
 
 
“Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?”304 According to Dayton, these were the first 
words the French minister of foreign affairs Edouard Drouyn de l’Huys said to him 
when he entered the Frenchman’s office on 21 April 1864.305 Drouyn de l’Huys had 
received news of a resolution regarding the conflict in Mexico which had recently 
passed the U.S. House of Representatives. The resolut ion, submitted by Maryland’s 
Radical Republican representative Henry Winter Davis, vehemently condemned 
Napoleon’s attempt to overthrow the Juárez administration. Drouyn de l’Huys went on 
to explain to Dayton that his government was concerned that the resolution signalled the 
 
Lincoln administration’s intent to take military action in Mexico against the French. 
 
The House’s approval of Davis’ resolution reflected a rising tide of interest 
amongst Union politicians in the nation’s Mexican policy. During 1864 and 1865 calls 
from politicians for the Lincoln government to either offer monetary and material aid to 
the Mexicans, or intervene directly to put an end to the French invasion grew in 
intensity. The cause gained greater political support as a Northern victory in the Civil 
War was viewed as more likely. This rise in interest was born in part from a desire to 
unite the disparate factions of the United States. Advocates of intervention argued that a 
foreign venture to fight imperial monarchism would reawaken the shared republican 
sentiments of Northerners and Southerners. In this way, they hoped, intervention would 
end the Civil War and, after April 1865, help bridge divisions wrought in the nation by 
decades of sectionalism and years of warfare. They also believed that by ousting the 
French from Mexico the United States would demonstrate to the world that it was ready 
to reclaim its position as the paramount nation in the Western Hemisphere. The 
symbolism of this act would impress upon the international community that the United 
States still held its place as an “exceptional” republic, and that the Western Hemisphere 
should not be considered prey by the European imperial powers. 
Historians note that Seward’s approach to the French invasion altered slightly 
 
during the final months of the Civil War. As military fortunes turned in the North’s 
 
favour, popular and political support throughout the Union for intervention in Mexico 
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grew. Maximilian’s position in Mexico was weakening, as was Napoleon’s commitment 
to supporting the “Mexican Empire.” Sexton notes that in response, Seward adopted a 
firmer tone in his communications with the French. The secretary used congressional 
demands for U.S. intervention in Mexico “to his diplomatic advantage” by warning 
Napoleon that “domestic pressure would give him no choice but to adopt more forceful 
tactics” if the emperor did not withdraw from Mexico.306 In 1865 Seward also chose 
General John A. Logan, a bitter critic of the French invasion, to be Corwin’s 
replacement in Mexico. Van Deusen describes this as a strategy of “pin pricks” which 
was designed to subtly apply pressure on Napoleon to end his venture in Mexico.
307 
Van 
Deusen and Sexton agree, however, that Seward remained loyal to his basic policy of 
non-intervention by continuing to oppose direct military action in Mexico. 
 
Van Deusen and Sexton are among those historians who argue that Seward 
based his wartime neutrality policy towards Mexico on his wish to prevent French 
interference in the Civil War. They fail, however, to explain why the secretary 
continued this policy throughout late 1864 and 1865 as the Civil War was drawing to a 
close and France’s position in Mexico weakened. Goldwert attempts to account for this 
seeming inconsistency in Seward’s actions. Throughout most of the Civil War, 
Goldwert alleges, Seward’s neutrality policy was geared towards avoiding French 
retaliation. He notes that by the end of 1864, however, Seward’s attention had shifted to 
the future of the U.S.-Mexican relationship. Goldwert concludes that Seward was 
concerned that U.S. intervention to end the French invasion would cause Mexico to 
“become financially dependent on the United States,” and that U.S. “troops might never 
leave” Mexico once they had become necessary for that republic’s survival. 308 
 
While Goldwert is correct in noting that Seward was wary of Mexico becoming 
reliant on the United States, he repeats the mistake made by other scholars of neglecting 
to analyse the entirety of Seward’s wartime Mexican policy in light of the secretary’s 
desires for the long-term nature and purpose of relations with Mexico. Seward believed 
that non-intervention in the affairs of foreign nations was essential for successful 
peaceful national expansion. Throughout the Civil War he sought to impress upon the 
international community that non-interventionism would henceforth be the cornerstone 
of the United States’ approach to foreign relations. This chapter shows that Seward 
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believed the final months of the Civil War and its immediate aftermath were a critical 
time in proving the validity of this claim. During this period the United States was 
emerging from the Civil War reunified and with significantly improved military 
capacities. By refusing to use this strength to intervene in Mexico, Seward believed, the 
United States could demonstrate its commitment to peaceful landed and commercial 
growth. Domestic support for intervention made Seward even more determined to 
maintain his neutrality policy. To him, political appetite for intervention was an 
ominous sign that the United States’ expansionist path might be disrupted just as the 
nation was recovering from its most recent crisis. Seward did not abandon his neutrality 
policy towards Mexico as the Civil War came to an end because his motivations behind 
the policy were unchanged. 
Archduke Maximilian had informally accepted the throne of the “Mexican 
Empire” in October 1863. He then commenced a tour of Europe to visit the royal courts 
before his scheduled departure for Mexico in early 1864. Confederate president 
Jefferson Davis was quick to take advantage of these developments to try to gain French 
recognition of the South. An independent Confederacy, Davis perceived, could help 
“guarantee Mexico against invasion from the United States.”309 Before Maximilian had 
arrived in Mexico, therefore, Davis appointed William Preston, former minister to Spain 
under President James Buchanan, as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to 
the imperial court of Mexico.
310 
Preston’s task was to negotiate a deal with the 
“Mexican Empire” whereby the South would recognise and support Maximilian’s 
 
regime in return for recognition from Mexico and, if possible, France. 
 
“Popular indignation in the United States” against the French invasion 
“mounted steadily” in response to these developments.311 Napoleon’s monarchical 
schemes were unfolding and the South’s moves to form an alliance with the “Mexican 
Empire” brought home to the people of the Union the potential danger posed to them by 
the overthrow of the Juárez government. Politicians were quick to respond to the 
changing tide of public opinion. In early 1863 McDougall had struggled to find much 
support in Congress for his proposals to intervene in Mexico. Although military action 
in Mexico was still viewed as extreme, by 1864 politicians of all stripes were taking a 
keener interest in the nation’s Mexican policy. A discourse surrounding the issue 
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emerged which reflected growing antipathy towards Napoleon and sympathy for the 
 
Juárez government. 
 
Romero, now minister to the United States, sought to capitalise on this shift in 
political opinion. In early 1864 he made several new contacts, such as Senators John 
Conness of California and Zachariah Chandler of Michigan. He met regularly with these 
politicians and provided them with information pertaining to recent developments in 
Mexico. He hoped his efforts would make them useful allies in his mission to pressure 
the Lincoln administration to offer assistance to the Juárez government. The growth in 
political interest in the situation in Mexico was reflected most clearly in the House of 
Representatives. The House was “more sensitive to popular discontent than the Senate” 
and was not subject to the influence of Sumner, who was now actively resisting 
resolutions for a change in Mexican policy, as the chair of its committee on foreign 
relations.
312 
In January 1864 Republican representative John A. Kasson of Iowa met 
 
with Romero to discuss Mexican policy. On 29 January Kasson submitted a resolution 
to the House which stated that Congress viewed the French invasion with the “deepest 
regret” and regarded it as “a menace to the dignity and permanence of popular 
government” on the continent.313 
One of the most fruitful contacts Romero made was Henry Winter Davis. 
Davis was a Radical Republican and chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Relations.  He had been a prominent player in the growing rift between Radical 
Republicans in Congress and the Lincoln administration.
314 
Friction between the two 
wings of the Republican Party had continued to build since the cabinet crisis of 
December 1862. The tension had been displayed most recently in Radical reactions to 
Lincoln’s issuance of the Ten Percent Plan in December 1863. The plan, which 
proposed means by which the Southern states could be re-admitted into the Union, was 
seen by many Radicals including Davis as too lenient. Davis’ wish to undermine the 
Lincoln administration and give more power over domestic and foreign policy-making 
to the Radicals in Congress would make him a useful ally to Romero.
315
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On 31 January Davis visited Romero with the intent ion, as Romero understood 
it, to “concern himself with our affairs.”316 After several meetings in which they 
discussed the situation in Mexico, Davis submitted a resolution to Congress on 4 April. 
The resolution stated that “the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to 
leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators 
of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico.”317 “They therefore 
 
think fit,” the resolution continued, “to declare that it does not accord with the policy of 
the United States to acknowledge any monarchical Government erected on the ruins of 
any republican Government in America under the auspices of any European Power.”318 
While the Lincoln administration’s official position stated that it would not recognise 
any new government in Mexico until all fighting in the country had ceased, Davis 
insisted that the United States would never hold relations with the “Mexican Empire.” 
In the debate following the submission of his resolution, Davis also expressed his 
opinion that the United States should intervene in Mexico “by force of arms, when the 
time shall come, and if this warning be not effective.”319 
 
In the speech Davis gave in support of his resolution he accused the Lincoln 
administration of holding tyrannical control over the conduct of foreign policy. “No 
President,” Davis declared, “has ever claimed such an exclusive authority ... It is certain 
that the Constitution nowhere confers such authority on the President.”320 The 
administration had used this power, Davis continued, to maintain a position towards the 
French invasion of Mexico which was “meek, inoffensive,” and “pusillanimous.”321 
Davis proclaimed that, in his effort to placate the French, Lincoln had disregarded the 
fate of the Mexican republic. This policy, he concluded, did not differ much from those 
of the antebellum Democratic administrations, which had “hectored, bullied, and 
plundered” Mexico “without even stretching out the hand of republican sympathy.”322 
Davis insisted that the solution was to restore Congress to its rightful role in 
 
shaping foreign policy. “We wish,” he stated, “to cultivate friendship with our 
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republican brethren of Mexico ... to aid in consolidating republican principles, to retain 
popular government in all this continent from the fangs of monarchical or aristocratic 
power.”323 Davis’ resolution was designed to signal Congress’ intent to reclaim its 
authority over deciding foreign policy. In doing so, Congress would check the rapid 
expansion of executive power. It would also ensure that the nation conducted its 
policies, specifically regarding Mexico, in accordance with its republican princip les. 
The resolution passed the House and then moved on to the Senate for approval. 
On 13 April Romero met with Sumner to discuss how the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations would act. Sumner told Romero that he wished to know Seward’s opinion 
regarding the resolution before taking any action. Romero replied that the resolution did 
not contradict Seward’s policy in any substantial way, and argued that it could in fact 
prove useful to the secretary as he could “shield himself with it when France asked for 
recognition of Archduke Maximilian as emperor of Mexico.”324 Romero doubted that 
 
his arguments had any effect on Sumner, whose “timid character” made him “even more 
complacent toward the French than Seward himself.”325 Romero’s pessimism was 
justified. By the end of June Sumner had successfully blocked the passage of the 
resolution by repeatedly delaying its discussion in the Senate.
326
 
Davis’ resolution came at an uneasy time in U.S.-French relations. During early 
 
1864 Napoleon’s government made several complaints to the State Department 
accusing the United States of violating its neutrality towards the conflict in Mexico. In 
January, for instance, Seward received word that J. H. Mansfield, the U.S. consul in 
Tabasco, had been imprisoned by French authorities for allegedly cooperating with 
Juarist forces in the region.
327 
Seward sent a nearby Union ship-of-war to the port of 
 
Tabasco, “not to use any force, but to inquire on the spot as to the facts” as “it was 
naturally felt that it would have been but just to the United States that they should have 
been notified of any complaint against their consul.”328 The French minister in 
Washington, Louis de Geofroy, wrote to Seward to register his “astonishment at the 
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measures taken by the government of the United States” which had “in appearance at 
least, the character of a certain minatory pressure, which is without justification in the 
incident itself.”329 Mansfield was eventually restored to his consulate, with the French 
claiming that it had been Juárez’s authorities which had imprisoned him without reason, 
and the incident eventually came to nothing.
330
 
In February the French government yet again accused the United States of 
violating its neutrality when it received reports that the commander of Union forces at 
Brownsville, General Francis J. Herron, had sent troops into Matamoras.
331 
The French 
authorities claimed that Herron had used the pretext of wanting to protect the U.S. 
consul at Matamoras in order to join forces with Mexican general Juan Cortina and help 
re-establish Juarist control in the region.
332 
The allegation proved false. Although 
Herron had sent some of his troops into Matamoras, he had done so in order to protect 
U.S. consul Leonard Pierce and had not cooperated with the Juarist military. Indeed, the 
incident had even elicited an objection from Romero, who had been ordered by his 
government to protest against U.S. forces entering Mexico.
333
 
Cooperation between U.S. citizens and the Juarists also provoked angry 
objections from the French. On 26 April de Geofroy wrote to Seward complaining of an 
association based in New Orleans named the Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine.
334 
De 
Geofroy claimed that the organisation consisted of Mexican refugees, U.S. citizens, 
Federal Army officers, and local politicians who were employing “all measures of 
propagandism” to transmit “arms and munitions ... toward the frontier of the Rio 
Grande” to aid the Juarists.335 Seward forwarded de Geofroy’s complaint to General 
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Nathaniel P. Banks stationed in Louisiana who, after investigation, assured Seward that 
the organisation was not engaged in any illegal activity. It was a collection of 
unimportant citizens, Banks reported, whose objective was to lobby the Lincoln 
administration to send troops into Mexico.
336
 
Despite France’s evident suspicions that the United States was covertly aiding 
 
the Juarists, Seward had reason to believe that Napoleon’s forces would soon leave 
Mexico. Information he received from his ministers in Europe assured him that, now 
that Maximilian was travelling to Mexico to take control of the “Mexican Empire,” 
Napoleon was looking to wash his hands of the expedition. On 18 April Dayton wrote a 
report to Seward detailing the transcript of a convention held between the governments 
of France and the “Mexican Empire” negotiating the terms of French withdrawal. “The 
French troops at present in Mexico,” the convention stated, “shall be reduced as soon as 
possible to a corps of 25,000 men … this corps, in order to safeguard the interests which 
 
led to the intervention, shall remain temporarily in Mexico” until Maximilian “... shall 
be able to organize the troops necessary to replace them.”337 The French would then 
leave the Foreign Legion, “composed of 8,000 men,” at the service of Maximilian for a 
period of six years.
338
 
It was in these precarious diplomatic circumstances that news reached Paris of 
Davis’ resolution. It seemed to the French that the United States was preparing to 
officially abandon its neutrality and send troops into Mexico. In response to these 
concerns, Dayton insisted to Drouyn de l’Huys that the French should not assume the 
United States intended to invade Mexico “on account of anything contained in those 
resolutions.”339 The resolution, he continued, “embodied nothing more than had been 
 
constantly held out to the French government from the beginning.”340 Having attempted 
to allay the French government’s alarm, Dayton awaited further directions from Seward. 
Seward sent his instructions to Dayton three days after the House had passed 
 
Davis’ resolution. He began by acknowledging that “this resolution truly interprets the 
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unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico.”341 He 
continued that “it is, however, another and distinct question, whether the United States 
would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the 
House of Representatives at this time.”342 Foreign policy, Seward asserted, “is a 
practical and purely executive question, and the decision of it constitutionally belongs, 
not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the 
United States.”343 “While the President receives the declaration of the House of 
Representatives with the profound respect to which it is entitled,” Seward concluded, 
“he does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this 
government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between France and 
Mexico.”344 
Seward had successfully “cooled the crisis” in Paris.345 Rather than allow Davis’ 
 
resolution appear to contradict his policy, the secretary underplayed its importance by 
diminishing “the validity of the House’s role in foreign affairs.”346 By doing so, he was 
able to assure the French government that no change in U.S. policy towards the war in 
Mexico was occurring. Seward had also made a note of informing Dayton that his 
instructions were the result of a meeting between himself and President Lincoln. No 
doubt this intimation was designed to add more weight to Seward’s assurances. It also 
showed the correspondence of opinion between Seward and Lincoln regarding Mexican 
policy, which was significant in light of the growing public and political criticisms of 
the State Department’s position towards the French invasion. 
Although his resolution did not pass in the Senate, Davis was undeterred and he 
continued in his efforts to wrest control over foreign policy from the executive 
branch.
347 
On 25 May he submitted a resolution requesting that the administration give 
Congress all State Department correspondence relating to Mexican affairs. The 
resolution passed and the details of Seward’s instructions to Dayton regarding the 4 
April resolution were made public. Davis was incensed that the secretary had belittled 
 
the importance of the House to the French and was convinced that this was further proof 
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that the Lincoln administration wished to cut Congress out of the foreign policy-making 
process. On 15 December Davis submitted a retaliatory resolution which stated that 
“Congress has a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in declaring and 
prescribing the foreign policy of the United States ... and it is the constitutional duty of 
the President to respect that policy.”348 Congressional resolutions, the resolution 
concluded, should never be a “topic of diplomatic explanation with any foreign 
power.”349 
As 1864 progressed Seward began to use popular and political expressions of 
antipathy towards the French invasion “to his diplomatic advantage.”350 In June he 
replied to repeated French claims that U.S. citizens were illegally trading with Juarist 
forces across the Mexican border. The Lincoln administration, Seward insisted, did not 
wish to start a war with France. “On the contrary,” he stated, “it is an administration 
which, by its very constitution, would be pacific and friendly towards France, and 
towards all nations.”351 “Nevertheless,” Seward continued, “it is not well to overlook 
the fact that a large mass of the American people, owing to the war of France against 
Mexico, are not less open to alienating influences in regard to France than the 
government of France can be in regard to the United States.”352 The Lincoln 
administration, Seward concluded, was finding it increasingly difficult to control public 
outrage over French actions and must therefore “calmly abide events which must 
determine whether in spite of our devotion to peace, the field of war on this continent 
must be enlarged.”353 
During the summer of 1864 Romero lobbied Union politicians with even greater 
energy and he succeeded in finding more congressmen willing to take up his cause. In 
May Senator Benjamin Wade from Ohio agreed to submit a resolution drafted by 
Romero which requested the State Department publish its correspondence with all 
nations relating to the situation in Mexico.
354 
In June McDougall asked Romero for 
information regarding the most recent developments in Mexico so that he could 
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distribute it amongst Democratic politicians in preparation for the Democratic Chicago 
Convention, where the Party would nominate its 1864 candidate for president.
355 
In 
September Zachariah Chandler, a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
assured Romero that within six months the United States would be in a position to send 
troops into Mexico to help Juárez oust the French.
356
 
Yet most politicians continued to be wary of advocating immediate military 
intervention in Mexico. “The most widely held opinion here,” Romero informed his 
government in May, “is that it is best for Congress not to occupy itself with Mexican 
affairs until General [Ulysses S.] Grant’s campaign results in the destruction of the 
Confederate army ... and the subsequent capture of Richmond.”357 Sumner corroborated 
this analysis, telling Romero in June that only a minority of politicians “believed that a 
war with France suited the interests of the United States because it would arouse the 
public spirit, not only to fight that power, but also more easily to subjugate the 
South.”358  A larger section thought that the United States should “assume a decisive, 
public position in opposition to the French intervention in Mexico” but not threaten 
military action.
359 
The majority of politicians, Sumner concluded, “believed it 
undesirable to give the French the slightest pretext of an excuse to intervene in favor of 
the South or indirectly aid the Confederates.”360 
As the Civil War progressed into the spring and summer of its fourth year, many 
in the Union were questioning whether the South could be defeated militarily. Having 
mounted a massive spring campaign against Lee’s army, General Grant was bogged 
down in trench warfare with the Confederates at Petersburg, Virginia, and by the 
summer seemed no closer to defeating Lee. Union general William T. Sherman’s forces 
were similarly stationed outside Atlanta, unable to take the city. With Northern 
advances having ground to a halt, few politicians wished to divide the nation’s forces by 
sending them abroad to fight in a foreign war. Romero’s success in persuading 
congressmen to take up his cause is therefore best understood in light of the 
approaching 1864 presidential election. Earlier in the year, political debate regarding 
 
Mexican policy had reflected a power struggle between the branches of the federal 
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government.
361 
By the summer, criticising Seward’s Mexican policy had become a 
useful strategy used by Northern politicians to attack the Lincoln administration and 
score points for their respective parties. This was most clearly displayed in the 
platforms each party wrote for the campaign. 
The Radical Republicans’ platform contained criticisms of the Lincoln 
administration similar to those articulated by Davis earlier in the year. Their convention, 
which met in Ohio in May, nominated John C. Frémont as their candidate and created a 
platform which proclaimed that the powers of the executive branch had become swollen 
during the war and needed to be retracted. To do this, the Radicals endorsed a one-term 
presidency, the protection of the rights of free speech and press, and the reinstatement of 
the writ of habeas corpus. Their platform also pledged to uphold and defend the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine, a clear reference to the situation in Mexico.
362 
The 
 
Radicals did not specifically outline what action should be taken with regard to Mexico, 
nor did they advocate outright military intervention. Their platform’s reference to the 
Monroe Doctrine, however, revealed the Radicals’ belief in the need to reinstate 
republican principles in the nation’s foreign policy. 
The Democratic Party nominated George B. McClellan as its presidential 
candidate and wrote a platform which also condemned the Lincoln administration for 
abusing its constitutional powers and violating the rights of U.S. citizens. The platform 
also insisted that the war effort to force the Southern states to rejoin the Union was 
futile and only served to further fracture the republic. Only by ending the war and 
beginning peace negotiations, the Democrats claimed, could the country hope to 
stabilise and reunify. At the Democratic Convention in August a delegate from 
Pennsylvania named Hamilton Allricks suggested the Party adopt a resolution into its 
platform which read, “We cannot view with indifference the open repudiation and 
violation of the Monroe doctrine, the establishment of an empire on the ruins of a 
neighboring republic.”
363 
As Dexter Perkins notes, although “there were certainly 
 
Democrats who would have liked to see” the United States intervene in Mexico, the 
 
Party had “adopted the extraordinary and injudicious course of seeking to capitalize the 
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war weariness of the North.”364 It was therefore “hardly in a position” to formally 
advocate military intervention in Mexico.
365 
Allricks’ plank was not incorporated into 
the final platform. 
Domestic political discourse which cast the administration’s policy of neutrality 
towards Mexico as un-republican and unpatriotic put the Republican Party under 
considerable pressure during the campaign. Although the Republicans could not openly 
attack the administration’s policy, they recognised the need to express a bold position 
regarding Mexico.  At the National Union Party Convention in June, therefore, the Party 
adopted a resolution which stated, “We approve the position taken by the Government 
that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of 
any European Power to overthrow by force ... the institutions of any Republican 
Government on the Western Hemisphere and that they will view ... as menacing to the 
peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such power to obtain 
new footholds for Monarchical Government ... in near proximity to the United 
States.”366 In this way, the Republicans attempted to show the strength of their 
 
commitment to defending republicanism abroad without undermining the Lincoln 
administration. 
As the 1864 party platforms reveal, Mexican policy had become fused with 
various programmes for the restoration of the U.S. republic to its original model and 
founding principles. Indeed, this was why Mexican policy had been such an effective 
partisan weapon throughout 1864. The question of what the proper response should be 
to a European monarchical power invading a fellow republic tapped into Northern 
politicians’ notions about the identity and role of their own nation. Each party felt that 
the integrity of the United States had been compromised as a result of the Civil War, 
and that their republic was in danger of either disintegrating or mutating into something 
other than its original model. As the parties pushed their agendas for the restoration of 
the country, they included the realignment of the nation’s foreign policy in keeping with 
its founding values as part of this process. Advocating aid or even intervention in 
Mexico had become a way for Union politicians to demonstrate their nationalism and 
 
loyalty to their nation’s republican principles. 
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When Lincoln accepted the Republican nomination for president on 27 June, he 
did so on the condition that the plank referring to Mexican policy was removed from the 
platform.
367 
Lincoln’s show of support for the administration’s current Mexican policy 
was reflective of the deeper understanding between himself and his secretary of state. 
Even within the Republican Party there were many who resented Seward’s apparent 
influence in the cabinet. At the Baltimore Convention anti-Seward elements had called 
for New York Democrat Daniel Wilkinson to be nominated for vice president. Support 
for Wilkinson was “essentially a move against ... Seward” as no single state could be 
allowed to hold two prestigious positions in the cabinet.
368 
Despite opposition to both 
Seward’s Mexican policy specifically and the secretary of state more broadly, however, 
Lincoln remained loyal to Seward and never considered his removal from the cabinet. 
During the spring and summer of 1864 Lincoln’s prospects for re-election 
looked dim. Grant and Sherman’s campaigns had stalled and the Republican Party had 
splintered. The president managed to nullify the threat of the Radicals by brokering a 
deal with Frémont whereby the Radical agreed to drop out of the presidential race in 
return for the removal of conservative Republican Montgomery Blair from the cabinet. 
The compromise once again unified the Republican vote and lessened McClellan’s 
chances of election. In autumn military fortunes turned in the North’s favour. Mobile 
Bay fell to the Federal Navy in August, and in September Sherman’s forces managed to 
finally break through and capture Atlanta. In October General Philip Sheridan secured 
Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley for the Union. Resurgence in national enthusiasm and 
support for the administration followed, and in November Lincoln won re-election by a 
large majority, making him the first president to gain a second term since Andrew 
Jackson in 1832. 
After Lincoln’s re-election, military efforts progressed rapidly and Northern 
victory in the Civil War looked increasingly certain. In mid-December General George 
H. Thomas’ troops destroyed Confederate general John Hood’s forces at Nashville. 
After gaining Atlanta, Sherman pressed on and reached the Atlantic Ocean at Savannah. 
He then advanced through South and North Carolina. Under severe pressure, the 
Confederate government’s diplomatic efforts became desperate. In late 1864 President 
Davis authorised a final appeal for European recognition. He sent letters to Mason and 
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Slidell to be relayed to the British and French governments. The letters stated that the 
Confederacy’s sole objective was “the vindication of our right to self-government and 
independence. For that end no sacrifice is too great, save that of honor.”369 The sacrifice 
Davis was proposing was the emancipation of the South’s slaves in return for European 
assistance in the Civil War. 
Davis’ government also appealed to the “Mexican Empire.” In September 
Confederate Trans-Mississippi commander general Edmund Kirby Smith, following the 
suggestions of governors and judges in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, asked Slidell to 
implore the French to occupy both banks of the Rio Grande. A Union invasion of 
Mexico, Slidell warned the French, could only be prevented if France helped the 
Confederacy gain its independence and thereby create a buffer between the United 
States and the “Mexican Empire.”370 This Confederate scheme was put to an end in 
 
early November when Brownsville was taken by Union troops. In December, Slidell also 
urged Napoleon’s government to take possession of Matamoros, the Mexican port across 
the river from Brownsville. This was necessary, Slidell argued, so that the French could 
counteract any Union efforts to aid the Juarists.
371
 
In another sign of Southern desperation, growing numbers of ex-Confederates 
 
were crossing the border into Mexico and joining Maximilian’s army “before the forces 
of the United States could shut the door against them by taking the line of the Rio 
Grande.”372 Two weeks after Lincoln’s re-election Romero was informed by “a friend” 
in New York that “there were serious intrigues on the part of many northern men, 
disgusted with the result of the late presidential election, in connexion with a 
considerable number of prominent men at the south” to recruit volunteers to fight for 
Maximilian.
373 
Maximilian was encouraging this emigration. The budget of the 
“Mexican Empire,” Romero informed Seward in December, “approaches forty millions 
of dollars, and the portions of Mexican revenue which are in the hands of the French are 
reckoned at four millions.”374 To cover this deficit, Maximilian was planning to sell or 
mortgage public domain to Southern emigrants. With the help of the French minister to 
the “Mexican Empire,” Marquis de Montholon, Maximilian had begun “alienating” 
 
369 Mahin, One War at a Time, 216. 
370 Ibid., 226 
371 Ibid. 
372 Romero to Seward, 3 December 1864, FRUS,  http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi- 
bin/FRUS/FRUSidx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS186566p3.p0581&id=FRUS.FRUS186566p3&isize 
=M&q1=portions%20of%20Mexican%20revenue (accessed 16 October 2012). 
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid. 
84  
 
 
lands in Sonora and Lower California for this purpose.
375 
In return for joining his army, 
 
Maximilian promised these emigrants that they could “operate in the development of 
the mines and extension of agriculture” in Mexico and eventually settle there.376 
Private citizens from the Union were also crossing the border into Mexico, 
although their purpose was to aid the Juarists. Throughout late 1864 and early 1865 
Seward received numerous complaints from de Geofroy that Juarist agents were 
operating in cities across the North to recruit volunteers for their forces. In February 
1865 the French Legation in the United States, headed by de Geofroy, informed Seward 
that Juarist agents “are busied in New York in organizing an emigration which would be 
directed towards Mexico, with an object hostile to the government of the emperor 
Maximilian.”377 “Brooklyn, Cincinnati, and Santa Fe,” the legation noted, “are the 
points of rendezvous for the emigrants,” which included ex-Federal Army officers and 
 
who had the financial support of some Northern bankers.
378 
Lincoln’s re-election had 
ensured the continuance of Seward’s non-intervention policy, and yet popular sympathy 
for the Mexican cause continued to run high. Convinced that their government could not 
be persuaded to intervene, these volunteers took it upon themselves to help defend the 
Mexican republic. 
Romero perceived that he could take advantage of this spontaneous Northern 
emigration southward. “If we must choose,” he wrote to his government, “between the 
aid offered us by this government and by private persons who are willing to bring forces 
to our country, evidently we ought to prefer this government because it is more 
responsible than the private individuals.”379 As Lincoln’s re-election had made it 
unlikely that the government’s neutrality could be reversed, however, “we are not faced 
with a situation that would allow us to accept one and reject the other.”380 “I believe,” 
he concluded, “we ought to extract the best possible deal out of what is proposed to 
us.”381 Romero convened regularly with his government’s agents in the United States to 
help coordinate their efforts in finding recruits for the Juarist army. 
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His efforts did not stop at encouraging voluntary emigration to Mexico. Romero 
had long believed that the ending of the Civil War would be his government’s best hope 
of receiving aid from the United States. The emigration of Unionists and Confederates 
to Mexico threatened to complicate matters and perhaps prolong the Civil War. In 
response, Romero devised a plan whereby Mexico would be the basis of Northern and 
Southern reconciliation, rather than their continued fighting. In November he 
volunteered himself to Seward to travel to Richmond as a representative of Mexico, “a 
nation most directly interested in the Civil War,” perhaps joined by other “Hispanic 
American representatives resident in Washington” such as the ministers of Venezuela, 
Columbia, and Chile.
382 
Romero proposed that he would then reason with the 
Confederate government and warn them that “Europe was stirring up discord and 
rejoicing at seeing the only republic that inspired respect on this continent divided and 
debilitated. France is preparing soon to do to the United States what it has been doing to 
Mexico.”383 The objective of this mission would be to persuade the Confederacy to 
discourage its citizens from joining Maximilian’s ranks and possibly convince it to lay 
down its arms and rejoin the Union in the face of a greater, foreign threat. 
Seward replied “with complete frankness” that the Union could not consider 
peace with the South until slavery, the cause of the rebellion, had been completely 
destroyed.
384 
He predicted that this would occur within five or six months, at which 
point the North and South would be ready to begin peace negotiations. Despite having 
received a resounding rejection from Seward, Romero did not give up his scheme and 
even developed it further to make use of the Southern emigration into Mexico. On 10 
January 1865 he met with Montgomery Blair, his most consistent ally and close friend. 
Romero suggested to Blair that “when the Southern cause should be deemed hopeless, 
which ... would occur within a month, Confederate President Jefferson Davis should be 
invited to lead an army of 200,000 men of all three arms to the Mexican Republic to 
throw the French out and, in this manner, to vindicate himself before his fellow 
citizens.”385 
Romero conceded that the “principal drawback to this arrangement exists in the 
danger to our independence” posed by having such a large number of Southerners in 
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Mexico.
386 
If it wished, the army could easily take possession of Mexican territo ry or 
even annex Mexico to the United States. Having spent four years in Washington, 
however, Romero was confident that the Lincoln administration did not desire any 
Mexican land. Even if the Confederates still harboured ambitions for territorial 
acquisition, “maintaining the equilibrium in the forces sent between the officers and 
soldiers from the North and South and taking other precautions would reduce this 
danger” to Mexican sovereignty.387 Romero therefore stipulated that the force should 
 
consist of equal proportions of Northern and Southern troops, and should be led by both 
 
Union and Confederate generals. 
 
Following much discussion, Blair approached his father Francis P. Blair Sr., 
long-time friend of Confederate president Davis, with Romero’s plan. Blair Sr. thought 
the idea had some merit and offered to present the proposals to Davis himself. Blair Sr. 
approached Lincoln with the idea in December 1864. The president replied that he could 
not permit any attempt to contact the Confederacy with a proposal for reconciliation 
until Savannah had fallen into Union control.
388 
This occurred on 21 December and 
 
Lincoln, perhaps keen to make up for the slight he had inflicted on the influential Blair 
family after he had asked for Montgomery’s resignation from the cabinet, gave Blair Sr. 
a pass to cross enemy lines and travel to Richmond. The plan was conducted in secrecy. 
The ostensible purpose of Blair Sr.’s trip was to recover papers which had been taken 
from his home at Silver Spring, Maryland, by Confederate soldiers the previous 
summer.
389
 
 
On 12 January Blair Sr. addressed Jefferson Davis. “Slavery,” he began, “is 
admitted now on all sides to be doomed – as an institution, all the world condemns 
it.”390   The only “obstruction to pacification” between the North and South, therefore, 
was overcome.
391 
The Confederacy, however, continued to fight and the “the issue is 
changed and War against the Union becomes a War for Monarchy.”392 Blair Sr. noted 
 
that the Confederacy was willing to emancipate its slaves and hold relations with a 
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foreign monarchy established on the ruins of an American republic in return for 
European recognition. It was also willing to allow its citizens to join the forces of this 
same monarchy, and invite foreign troops into its country for this same purpose. The cry 
for Southern independence, Blair Sr. surmised, “is converted into an appeal for succor 
to European potentates, to whom they offer, in return, homage as dependencies!”393 
 
Southern concessions and negotiations with Napoleon and Maximilian, Blair Sr. 
continued, constituted “the most modern exemplification of this programme for 
discontented Republican States defeating their popular institutions by intestine 
hostilities.”394 Just as McDougall had done when he stood before the Senate in January 
1863, Blair Sr. evoked the historic and modern strategies used by predatory powers to 
conquer republics. He noted that throughout history imperial powers had sought to 
weaken and destabilise independent republics by encouraging internal discontent and 
making contact with dissatisfied factions within them. Most recently, Napoleon had 
sought and utilised connections with Mexican Conservatives in order to gain their 
cooperation in his invasion. By aligning itself with Napoleon and Maximilian, Blair Sr. 
argued, the Confederacy was ensuring the destruction of the U.S. republic by these 
same means. 
Blair Sr. continued that though the Civil War had profoundly shaken the United 
States, the U.S. republic nonetheless remained “exceptional.” “With the blessing of 
Heaven,” he insisted, “the Great American Republic, will foil this design of the central 
Despotism of Europe.”395 Despite the conflict which had separated them from their 
Northern brethren, Southerners were bound to the people of the Union by their shared 
“love of liberty nurtured by popular institutions.”396 Now that the chief cause of the 
Civil War was removed, all that remained was to remind the people of the Union and 
Confederacy of their shared identity. If Davis would accept an armistice with the Union, 
the North and South could assemble a “force on the banks of the Rio Grande” which 
would cross into Mexico with the purpose of “expelling the invaders, who taking 
advantage of the distractions of our own Republic, have overthrown that of Mexico.”397 
By fighting together against a monarchical enemy, the North and South could be 
 
reconciled on the basis of their common adherence and allegiance to republicanism. 
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By invading Mexico, Blair Sr. continued, Napoleon’s government had attempted 
to “rule that land” and “spread its power over ours” in North America.398 He argued that 
part of the United States’ role and destiny as the “exceptional” republic was that it 
“claims the Continent for its pedestal.”399 If the United States went into Mexico and 
triumphed over the French, it would demonstrate to the world that it was ready to 
reclaim its role as paramount nation in the Western Hemisphere. The venture would 
impress upon the European powers that the region was destined to be a republican, 
U.S.-led sphere of influence and could never again be considered suitable for re- 
colonisation. 
Blair Sr. concluded by informing Davis of the support which this plan had in the 
 
Union. In this, he made some exaggerations, neglecting to inform Davis that Lincoln 
had requested the plank referring to Mexican policy be removed from the 1864 
Republican platform. “The Republican party,” Blair Sr. stated, “has staked itself on the 
assertion of the Monroe doctrine.”400 “The Democrats of the North,” he continued, 
“have proclaimed their adhesion to it and I doubt not from the spirit exhibited by the 
Congress now in session, however unwilling to declare war, it would countenance all 
legitimate efforts short of such result, to restore the Mexican Republic.”401 Peace 
between the North and South, the vindication of the Confederate leaders in the eyes of 
the people of the Union, and the restoration of the U.S. republic to its rightful place and 
role in the Western Hemisphere could all be achieved through military action in 
Mexico. 
Davis refused Blair Sr.’s offer. The president was still hopeful that recognition 
of Confederate independence by Maximilian, Napoleon, or both would soon be 
forthcoming. From Davis’ meeting with Blair Sr., however, it was agreed that 
Confederate and Union representatives would meet at Hampton Roads to continue talks 
on the possibility of peace.
402 
Meanwhile news of Blair Sr.’s visit to Richmond spread 
to Europe. In March Seward received reports that Napoleon’s government was 
concerned about rumours that the United States intended to reunify on the basis of a 
venture into Mexico. Many in Paris were questioning the wisdom of withdrawing from 
 
Mexico if it meant leaving Maximilian’s regime to the mercy of an invading U.S. force. 
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Seward replied to the French government that, in keeping with its republican 
principles, the United States “firmly repels foreign intervention here, and looks with 
disfavor upon it anywhere.”403 The Lincoln administration therefore disapproved of 
Napoleon’s invasion of Mexico. By the same token, Seward continued, “for us to 
intervene in Mexico would be only to reverse our own principles, and to adopt in regard 
to that country the very policy which in any case we disavow.”404 Any attempt by 
France or the United States to force a particular form of government on the Mexican 
people would be useless because the “traditions and sympathies” of peoples and nations 
“could not be uprooted by the exercise of any national authority.”405 Seward concluded 
that “it would seem that all parties must abide the trial of the experiment, of which trial 
it will be confessed that the people of Mexico must ultimately be the arbiters.”406 In his 
 
official communications with the French, therefore, Seward continued to accept 
Napoleon’s assurances that the Mexican people would be given the opportunity to vote 
for the form of government they desired. 
Seward believed that his confidence in the Mexicans’ preference for a republic 
was being shown to be well-founded. On 10 April Maximilian announced the formal 
constitution of the “Mexican Empire.” The constitution provided for a thirty-four 
member council which would be elected through popular vote, as well as the 
preservation of the rights to equality before the law and equality of worship for Mexican 
citizens. These concessions were a bid by Maximilian to win the support of a greater 
proportion of the Mexican population, particularly Liberals. His efforts were 
unsuccessful, however, and failed to attract more support for his regime. 
407 
In his 
attempt to conciliate Liberals, moreover, Maximilian lost the support of much of the 
 
clergy, the traditional ally of the Mexican Conservatives. 
 
This lack of popular support for Maximilian’s regime was noted by politicians 
in Paris. On 17 April John Bigelow sent a report to Seward of a debate which had taken 
place in the Corps Legislatif regarding a resolution submitted by Jules Favre.
408 
The 
resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Mexico. 
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Napoleon and his conservative supporters, Favre stated, had led the French people to 
believe that the expedition would be “received with universal enthusiasm” by the 
Mexicans.
409 “Unhappily,” Favre continued, “this was not the case.”410 French blood 
had “freely flowed” in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the Mexican 
people.
411 
Mexico was still in a state of war and yet, Favre asked, “once placed upon the 
 
throne” shouldn’t Maximilian “be able to defend himself?”412 Maximilian’s regime 
could not exist without French troops, and therefore the French government must either 
withdraw immediately, or commit itself to an “interminable war” in Mexico.413 
The assassination of Lincoln on 14 April and the subsequent inauguration of 
President Andrew Johnson was seen by Romero as an opportunity to bring about a 
change in U.S. Mexican policy. The close agreement between Seward and Lincoln had 
meant that over the course of the Civil War Romero had largely given up trying to 
directly lobby the administration to change its course. Now that the Civil War was over 
and a new president had taken control of the administration, Romero attempted yet 
again to work through the executive branch. He also had reason to be hopeful that 
Johnson would be more disposed to help the Mexican republic than Lincoln had proven 
himself to be. Romero noted to his government that in July 1864 Johnson had given a 
speech in which he endorsed “without reservation that part of the convention’s platform 
relative to the Monroe Doctrine” and “demonstrated full comprehension of the 
importance and the significance of the French intervention in Mexico.”414 
Romero used his connection with Preston King, former senator from New 
 
York and close friend of Johnson, to gain a private interview with the new president on 
 
24 April. As he had to Lincoln in 1861, Romero began by noting the similarities in 
principles and interests which existed between the Juárez government and the United 
States. He then informed Johnson that the objective of Napoleon’s expedition was 
“more hostile toward the United States ... than toward Mexico itself.”415 Conducted at a 
moment when the U.S. republic was split apart in civil war, Romero noted, France’s 
aim in the invasion could only have been to aid in the destruction of the United States. 
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There was, he added, a “very profound and open sympathy between the Southern rebels 
and the traitors in Mexico” based largely on their shared hatred of the Union.416 Romero 
considered registering with Johnson his dissatisfaction with Seward’s approach over the 
past three years towards the French invasion. He decided, however, that this was unwise 
considering that “upon recovering [Seward] might well return to the State Department, 
in which case I would be placed in a very false position in regard to him.”417 
 
When Romero questioned the president regarding the speeches in which he 
had proclaimed his support for upholding the Monroe Doctrine, Johnson replied that he 
had “not changed his ideas nor would he change them ... They would remain his guide 
when the hour to act arrived.”418 This was encouraging, yet vague support. Although 
Johnson expressed sympathy for the Mexican cause and gave some indications that he 
would be willing to consider a policy different from Seward’s, he did not outline what 
that policy might be or when the “hour to act” might occur. Unwilling to rely solely on 
these uncertain signals, Romero continued to pursue other channels. He remained 
attached to the idea of sending a voluntary force into Mexico. With public spirits 
running high at the end of the Civil War and popular sympathy towards Mexico gaining 
strength, Romero perceived that involving some popular public figure in his cause 
would generate the support he desired. 
Just such a figure came in the form of Union Army hero General Grant. 
Romero had met Grant on several occasions over the course of the Civil War and 
judged him to be sympathetic to the Mexican republic’s cause. On 30 April Romero 
visited Grant in order to gain a clearer understanding of the general’s opinion of the 
French invasion. After a long discussion, Romero concluded that “although he is tired 
of war,” Grant’s “major desire is to fight in Mexico against the French.”419 Above all, 
 
Grant believed that the “Monroe Doctrine has to be defended at any price.”420 In 
particular, Grant was concerned about the number of Southern refugees spilling over the 
border into Mexico, and believed that this could complicate the process of reunifying 
the United States. 
 
Throughout May Romero and Grant met regularly to discuss how to bring about 
 
U.S. military action in Mexico. An unofficial intervention through the use of volunteers 
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seemed to both to be the best means. Veteran forces on the Texan border could be 
“mustered out” and then led into Mexico to join Juárez’s forces. This way, the 
intervention would take on an unofficial nature. They hoped that by not formally 
implicating the U.S. government the venture would be more likely to gain the Johnson 
administration’s approval. Determined to circumvent Seward, Romero and Grant both 
visited the president to put their plan before him directly. 
On 18 July Romero met with Johnson and proposed to him his plan for sending 
a voluntary force of veterans into Mexico. Romero suggested that a commander of the 
Union Army should be appointed with the ostensible purpose of escorting U.S. 
“emigrants” across the border into Mexico. These “emigrants” would be armed and 
once in Mexico would take on Mexican citizenship. They would then join the Juarists 
and help to dismantle Maximilian’s regime. Romero was frustrated when Johnson 
replied that the minister must present the plan to Seward before any discussion or action 
could take place. When Romero insisted that the “plan would encounter the secretary of 
state’s open opposition,” Johnson disagreed, adding mildly that “it will do no harm.”421 
Grant was more successful in his meeting with the president. On 20 July 
 
Johnson gave the general permission to “proceed on his own account without consulting 
or arranging prior approval for his actions.”422 Johnson had decided that if the scheme 
were to maintain an unofficial character, it would be better to avoid any further 
governmental involvement in its arrangement. Romero and Grant were encouraged by 
this tacit approval from the president and renewed their efforts. On 27 July General 
John M. Schofield accepted their offer to coordinate the voluntary emigration of 
veterans into Mexico.
423 
He was to go to Texas in the role of inspector of the United 
States Army, oversee the discharge of the troops stationed along the border, and then 
guide them as private citizens into Mexico. 
Romero’s plans soon met with an obstacle. On 4 August he learned that 
Schofield had discussed his up-coming mission with Seward. The secretary had assured 
the general that he “looked with favor on the project” but wished to add “another step 
which would contribute to the fuller success of the enterprise.”424 Seward proposed that 
Schofield first travel to France and meet with Napoleon “as a confidential agent” of the 
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U.S. government.
425 
Schofield should then explain to the emperor “the existing danger 
of a rupture between France and the United States if Napoleon would not withdraw his 
forces from Mexico.”426 Schofield, “captivated” and flattered by the prospect of such an 
important mission, agreed to Seward’s proposal.427 Romero was incensed, convinced 
that Seward “desires to undo the arrangement” by separating Schofield “from the 
undertaking, and then, by presenting delays, allow enough time to transpire to abort the 
project or allow Seward’s other plans to mature.”428 Romero’s fears were realised. 
 
Schofield was appointed a special agent of the U.S. government and arrived in France in 
December. During his six month visit he met with Napoleon, but never had a private 
interview with the emperor and ultimately “played absolutely no part in high-level 
negotiations” between his government and the French.429 
Throughout the second half of 1865 Maximilian continued to encourage the 
 
emigration of Southerners to Mexico. On 5 September he issued a series of decrees. One 
of them, Corwin informed Seward, sanctioned de facto slavery “with the view of 
inducing our southern planters to emigrate, with their slaves, to Mexico.”430 In October 
Maximilian’s efforts to draw in the “discontented citizens of the United States who are 
not disposed to acknowledge the authority of this government, nor accept the 
consequences of the late civil war” developed.431 Dozens of prominent ex-Confederate 
officials had been appointed by Maximilian as agents of colonisation.
432 
Matthew F. 
Maury, formerly a Confederate agent in Europe, was appointed “imperial commissioner 
of immigration” and John B. Magruder, a Confederate general who had been stationed 
 
in Texas, was “charged with the supervision of the survey of lands for colonization.”433 
 
Their roles involved surveying Mexican land, setting aside suitable portions specifically 
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for the use of Southern emigrants, and encouraging the flow of people from the United 
 
States into Mexico. 
 
Seward viewed Maximilian’s efforts as reflecting the “emperor’s” inability to 
find elements of support in Mexico to sustain his regime. The secretary saw the time as 
right, therefore, to alter the tone of his dispatches to the French in the hopes of 
pressuring Napoleon to hasten his withdrawal from Mexico. In response to a comment 
by Drouyn de l’Huys that the French would leave Mexico sooner if the United States 
would recognise Maximilian’s government, Seward replied with forceful language. 
“The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico,” he wrote, “and its 
maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not the free will of the people 
of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the United States.”434 The U.S. government, 
 
Seward continued, “regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial 
government in Mexico as disallowable and impracticable.”435 Therefore, Seward 
concluded, “they are not prepared to recognize, or to pledge themselves hereafter to 
recognize, any political institutions in Mexico which are in opposition to the republican 
government with which we have so long and so constantly maintained relations of amity 
and friendship.”436 In a significant departure from his previous communications to the 
French, Seward now insisted that the United States would never recognise a non- 
republican government in Mexico. 
In December Seward explained to Napoleon’s government why the United 
 
States would never hold relations with the “Mexican Empire.” In doing so, the secretary 
abandoned all pretence that he believed the Mexican people would be permitted to vote 
for the form of government they desired. “The French army which is now in Mexico,” 
Seward stated, “is invading a domestic republican government there which was 
established by her people, and with whom the United States sympathize most 
profoundly.”437 The United States would not intervene in Mexico because it did not feel 
 
itself  “called upon to make a war of propagandism throughout the world, or even on 
 
this continent, in the republican cause.”438 “We have sufficient faith,” Seward continued, 
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“in the eventual success of that cause on this continent, through the operation of existing 
material and moral forces.”439 Seward concluded that, by their continuous fighting and 
refusal to tolerate the “Mexican Empire,” the Mexican people had given “decisive and 
conclusive, as well as very touching proofs” that they preferred republicanism as their 
form of government.
440 
The United States would acquiesce to the Mexican peoples’ 
choice and continue to recognise only the Juárez administration. 
Seward then made another significant change in his approach to relations with 
the French. Having spent much of the Civil War convincing the Europeans that the 
United States had abandoned its schemes of expansion, Seward revealed to Napoleon’s 
government his vision for the U.S. republic’s future in North America. There had long 
been the belief amongst the governing classes of Europe, Seward wrote, that “we intend 
to spread our armies not merely over the slaveholding States, but over Canada on the 
one side, and Mexico on the other.”441 “Were it admitted to be our policy to acquire 
 
those countries,” he continued, “the true way to bring it about would be by patience, 
conciliation, and the establishment of a harmony of interests that would bring on that 
end as a perfectly natural result.”442 “There is an irresistible logic of events,” Seward 
concluded, “which requires that Europeans shall confine their rule to the eastern 
continent” and retreat from North America.443 Seward insisted that the Northern victory 
in the Civil War and the crumbling of the “Mexican Empire” had validated 
republicanism in North America. The European powers, he believed, could no longer 
expect to hinder the United States as it embarked on the next stage of its programme for 
peaceful landed expansion and commercial growth. 
The final years of the Civil War were a critical time for Seward in maintaining 
his neutrality policy towards Mexico. The domestic opposition which he faced put 
pressure on the secretary to aid the Mexican republic. Seward had faith, however, that 
the Mexicans were able and willing to defend their republican institutions, and by the 
end of 1865 the secretary believed this faith had been validated. The “Mexican Empire” 
was deteriorating and the French were planning the withdrawal of their troops. By 
allowing the Mexicans to fight alone, Seward believed he had offered the international 
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community resounding proof that republicanism would henceforth be a permanent 
fixture in North America and across the Western Hemisphere. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Seward’s wartime Mexican policy was designed to forward his pre-Civil War 
expansionist vision. Scholarly studies regarding his time as secretary of state have 
overlooked this fact.
444 
Historians assume that Seward abandoned his expansionist 
agenda during his time in the State Department because of the constraints of the Civil 
War. They argue that steering the nation through its crisis and preventing foreign 
interference in the war was a higher priority for Seward than advancing his programme 
for the physical enlargement of the United States. Any bold acts of expansion, they add, 
were risky in a diplomatic environment in which relations with the European powers 
were precarious and often tense. Seward’s Mexican policy is used as a case in point for 
this argument. His apparent compliance towards Napoleon III as the emperor attempted 
to conquer Mexico fits neatly into the argument that Seward had to give up his 
expansionist ambitions during the Civil War in order to protect the Union from a 
foreign attack. 
 
Historians’ failure to identify the expansionist elements in Seward’s wartime 
Mexican policy is principally due to their lack of appreciation for the secretary’s 
interpretation of the nature of human, national, and global progress. Seward subscribed 
to the teleological theory that mankind was always improving and progressing towards 
its ideal state, which he believed to be republican government. Seward was influenced 
by the values of classical liberalism and saw republicanism as the best means of 
advancing them. It provided for individual political freedom through a system of 
representative democracy and was well-suited to supporting an economic system based 
on free market and liberal trading principles. Republicanism, Seward believed, was the 
most efficient means of achieving national economic diversity, prosperity, social 
mobility, and liberty and would therefore eventually be adopted by all nations. 
Seward proclaimed that in this inevitable and unceasing global journey, the 
United States had an important role to play. As the first American republic, it would act 
as a guide and example to the other nations of the world as they strove towards 
republicanism. Once sufficiently practised in the art of self-governance, Canada, 
Mexico, and Cuba were, Seward believed, destined to seek admittance into the United 
States and become part of the Union. The other nations of the Western Hemisphere 
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would model their governments on that of the United States and the region would 
evolve into a community of ideological affinity and commercial interest. The United 
States could then use the Western Hemisphere as an economic base from which to 
develop into a world power. 
Seward believed that before the United States could fulfil its role in the Western 
Hemisphere, certain national and global requirements needed to be met. During his pre- 
Civil War career he identified three requirements which he viewed as rapidly moving 
towards completion. The first was the economic, industrial, and social consolidat ion of 
the United States. Slavery, Seward believed, was the principal obstacle to this process. 
The institution inhibited domestic industrial and economic integration and hindered the 
social and financial advancement of the Southern states. Slaveholders in government 
pushed for policies of aggressive acquisition, a style of expansion Seward viewed as 
counter-productive to the nation’s interests and contradictory to its principles. The 
question of whether slavery ought to be permitted in new territories, moreover, caused 
substantial internal division in the United States and complicated the process of 
extending its boundaries. As long as slavery remained in the United States, the 
consolidation of the country and the peaceful extension of its physical limits could not 
occur. 
 
The second requirement was the adoption and stabilisation of republican 
governments by the nations of the Western Hemisphere, particularly those which 
Seward anticipated would be brought into the United States. This process had begun in 
earnest in the 1810s and 20s when a series of independence movements had swept 
across the region and struck a serious blow to the power of the European empires. 
Seward insisted that once the process from colony to independent state to republic had 
begun, it could not be reversed. Nevertheless, by the mid-nineteenth century many of 
these newly-independent nations were still experiencing severe economic distress, 
social disorder, and political factionalism. Few had managed to establish sound 
democratic institutions and none had reached the level of stability Seward saw as 
necessary before they could be considered functioning and successful republics. 
The third requirement was the absolute retreat of the European powers from the 
Western Hemisphere and their acquiescence to U.S. preponderance in the region. 
Seward believed that the governments of Europe did not understand the nature of 
republican government or the pull it had over the people of the Western Hemisphere. 
Nor did they realise that republicanism had already taken root in the region and could 
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not be forcibly removed. Consequently, the European powers continued to create 
schemes for re-colonising independent American nations. In the antebellum period 
Seward expressed his belief that when a European imperial power next attempted to 
extend its presence in the Western Hemisphere, it would encounter unceasing resistance 
and experience a resounding defeat. This would prove to the world that the people of the 
region were committed to republicanism and that European colonies could no longer 
exist there. 
In the 1860s Seward perceived that these three requirements were nearing 
completion and were manifested in the concurrent crises of the American Civil War and 
Napoleon’s attempt to overthrow the Mexican Juárez government. When the Civil War 
began in 1861 Seward believed it signalled the coming end of slavery in the United 
States. At the time the Mexican republic was emerging from its own civil war and had 
established a Liberal government which pledged to model Mexico’s economic, 
commercial, and political systems on those of the United States. When the French 
invasion began in 1862 Seward viewed it as a test of the Mexicans’ commitment to 
republicanism. Confident that they would pass this test and throw out their French 
invaders, he anticipated that Napoleon’s venture would stand as proof to the other 
European powers that they could no longer hope to re-establish their rule over the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. Once the Mexicans had restored their republic and 
the United States had abolished slavery, Seward predicted, the peaceful incorporation of 
Mexico into the Union could follow. 
Seward’s wartime approach to relations with Mexico was constructed to 
 
facilitate the accomplishment of this goal. Beginning in 1861 he made significant efforts 
to reverse the recent trend in U.S.-Mexican relations, which had been characterised by 
conflict and conquest. Seward renounced territorial gain as an objective of U.S. 
Mexican policy, insisting instead that the United States wished to build a relationship 
with Mexico based on commercial cooperation and ideological fraternity. This policy, 
Seward believed, would allow and encourage the Mexicans to politically stabilise and 
economically develop their republic. 
When the French invaded Mexico in 1862 Seward invoked his long-held belief 
that American republics should be capable of sustaining and defending themselves 
without the need for U.S. support. He perceived that republicanism had already become 
sufficiently entrenched in Mexico to make it impossible for a foreign monarchy to exist 
there for long. Accordingly, Seward followed a policy of studied neutrality towards the 
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conflict, insistent that once they had thrown out the French and put down the internal 
disloyal factions which had cooperated with them, the Mexicans would have advanced 
another step towards establishing a functioning republic. 
Seward’s non-intervention policy also had an international dimension. He 
wished to demonstrate to the world that since the secession of the Southern states, the 
United States was no longer a grasping, acquisitionist power and instead wished to 
pursue relations with all countries based on peaceful commercial cooperation. American 
nations should therefore no longer regard the United States as a threat to their 
sovereignty, and the European powers should not consider it a physical threat to their 
possessions and interests in the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, all countries should 
seek to collaborate with the U.S. republic in developing global commerce. By not 
intervening in Mexico, Seward also hoped to prove to the European powers that the 
United States did not need to use force to sustain republican government in the Western 
Hemisphere. The people of the region had chosen republicanism and could not be 
compelled to give it up. The European powers must therefore accept that the Western 
Hemisphere was a republican sector, a U.S. sphere of influence, and no longer fit for 
monarchical imperialism. 
Much of what Seward anticipated came to fruition. In December 1865 the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution outlawed slavery in the newly-reunited U.S. 
republic. The French invasion of Mexico was unsuccessful despite U.S. neutrality 
towards the conflict. Napoleon’s failure to re-establish a French American empire had a 
profound impact on the European powers. It compounded their opinion that imperial 
ventures ought to be focussed in other areas around the world, and they henceforth 
refrained from attempting to extend their influence in the Western Hemisphere. Seward 
also made significant gains in redefining the purpose and tone of U.S. foreign policy. 
He repaired much of the damage done in previous decades to relations with Mexico and 
began to rebuild the relationship on a basis of mutual respect and cooperation. By 
rejecting aggressive territorial acquisition, moreover, Seward left the door open for 
future commercial collaboration with the European powers. 
Seward’s success in changing the long-term U.S. approach to national physical 
enlargement and economic growth in the Western Hemisphere is more uncertain. 
Although he was successful in maintaining his country’s neutrality towards the French 
invasion of Mexico, Seward was battling against a rising tide of interventionism in U.S. 
politicians’ attitudes towards foreign policy. Domestic wartime political support for 
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intervention in Mexico was largely based on concerns surrounding the United States’ 
“exceptional” identity. The notion of U.S. “exceptionalism” was based on the belief that 
other republics, past and present, were susceptible to internal discontent, factionalism, 
and disorder. This would frequently lead to the rise of centralised governments or 
dictatorships in these countries. In other cases, such republics would separate and fall 
apart, often with the agency of predatory foreign powers. 
The narrative of U.S. “exceptionalism” claimed that the United States was 
immune to these weaknesses. There was, however, a persistent undercurrent of 
uncertainty regarding this myth which showed itself most plainly at times of national 
expansion. The Mexican War 1846-48, for instance, caused many U.S. politicians to 
question whether the institutions and framework of their country could withstand the 
extension of its boundaries. They worried that too large an expanse of land and diversity 
of population could weaken bonds of national identity, strain economic and 
communication networks, and dilute chains of government authority. A foreign policy 
geared towards landed expansion, they added, could easily turn aggressive and 
imperialistic and therefore contradict the United States’ mission to promote republican 
government in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Civil War was the greatest blow to the myth of U.S. “exceptionalism.” The 
secession of the Southern states showed that regional and sectional interests could 
trump bonds of national identity. Instability within the Union over the course of the 
Civil War gave some, such as Senator James McDougall, reason to believe that further 
separations would follow. The splintering of the Republican Party signalled rising 
factionalism while conflicts between the branches of the federal government displayed 
anxiety regarding the integrity of the nation’s political institutions. Some politicians, 
such as Representative Henry Winter Davis, believed that the executive branch was 
capitalising on the nation’s crisis to expand its powers. The United States, in short, 
seemed to be falling into the states of chaos and despotism which had overwhelmed 
those republics which had preceded it. 
In these circumstances, the French invasion of Mexico constituted to some 
Union politicians a dire warning for the future of the United States. Napoleon’s attempt 
to re-colonise Mexico would have offended the United States at any time as support for 
republican institutions and antipathy towards European imperialism in the Western 
Hemisphere had been a traditional tenet of its foreign policy. In the context of the Civil 
War, however, what was occurring in Mexico was construed by some Northern 
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politicians as a sign of what would soon befall their country. Secession, the ongoing 
Civil War, continued disorder within the Union, and uncertainties regarding the balance 
of power within the federal government caused them to believe that the Union was 
vulnerable to foreign invasion. This fear led them to advocate giving assistance to or 
even intervening in Mexico to repel the French. 
Advocates of intervention in Mexico based their appeals on the need to both 
protect the U.S republic and regain and reassert its republican principles and 
“exceptionalist” identity. McDougall, for instance, believed that a foreign venture to 
fight imperial monarchism would reinvigorate amongst U.S. citizens a sense of their 
shared nationality and detach Southerners from the Confederate cause. The political 
discourse surrounding Mexican policy during the 1864 presidential campaign cast 
giving aid to Mexico as a necessary part of realigning the United States’ foreign policy 
with the nat ion’s republican values. It was also set within the wider context of the 
perceived need to restore the U.S. republic to its original model. By the end of the Civil 
War individuals such as Francis P. Blair Sr. who called for a joint North-South 
expedition to Mexico argued that such a venture would demonstrate to the world that 
the United States was ready to reclaim its dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Domestic political support for assistance to Mexico gained strength over the 
course of the Civil War. The policy of direct intervention in Mexico, however, was 
advocated in earnest by relatively few Northern politicians. Nevertheless, the discourse 
which emerged surrounding wartime Mexican policy associated interventionism in 
foreign policy with notions of nationalism and fidelity to republican principles. This 
attitude would contribute to the emergence of the interventionism which directed U.S. 
policy in the Western Hemisphere during the 1880s and 90s.
445 
In this sense Seward, 
 
who wished to alter fundamentally the course of U.S. expansionism, failed in one of his 
principal goals as secretary of state. 
The dynamics of the struggle between Seward and his domestic critics over 
Mexican policy can be understood through the notion of confidence. In the mid st of the 
Civil War many Northern politicians feared that the U.S. republic was in decline. 
Somewhat paradoxically, this fear and doubt contributed to calls for the United States to 
embark on a robust interventionist policy abroad. Seward, however, never doubted the 
ultimate survival of both the U.S. and Mexican republics. Indeed, he viewed the 
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countries’ respective crises as hallmarks of progress which would usher in the next 
stage of the United States’ continental destiny. This confidence led Seward to use his 
influence over relations with Mexico to prepare the way for a new era of U.S. 
expansionism by adopting a policy towards that country based on ideological support, 
commercial cooperation, and non-intervention. 
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